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ABSTRACT
In the last several decades, there has been a marked shift in
local government financing away from the use of general
revenue taxes and toward nontax revenue-raising devices such
as exactions. This Article argues that the Supreme Court, in its
exaction cases, missed a golden opportunity to slow this
troubling trend toward the greater privatization of local
government financing. In addition, it explains how the Court's
exaction cases are inconsistent with the goal of burden distribu-
tion as reflected in the Court's takings jurisprudence. The
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Article proposes that the constitutional standard applied to
exactions be reformulated to account explicitly for burden
distribution. Such a reformulation will make exactions law
more consistent with the purposes of the Takings Clause and
will constitute an important first step in restoring a more
sensible balance between tax and nontax revenue-raising
devices.
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INTRODUCTION
The conditions that the government imposes when it approves
development proposals put forward by property owners are known
as exactions. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission' and
Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 the Supreme Court applied a form of
heightened scrutiny in assessing whether the exactions at issue
constituted takings. In Nollan, the Court demanded an "essential
nexus" between the goal pursued by the government through the
imposition of the exaction and the nature of that exaction.3 In
Dolan, the Court required a "rough proportionality" between the
impact of the owner's proposed development and the nature and
extent of the exaction.4 If either of those two requirements is not
met, the challenged exaction will constitute a taking.5
Nollan and Dolan have received a great deal of attention from
commentators, who can be divided roughly into two camps. The
first is enthusiastically supportive of the opinions.7 The second is
forcefully critical of the idea of applying heightened scrutiny to
exactions because it leads to (1) underregulation, as governments
require less of owners than what is constitutionally permitted to
1. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
4. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
5. See id.; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
6. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473 (1991); J. David Breemer, The
Evolution of the 'Essential Nexus": How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and
Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373 (2002); David L.
Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights
Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing
About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of
Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOwA L. REV. 1 (2000); Mark Fenster, Takings
Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 609 (2004); Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using
Eminent Domain To Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801
(1995); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak
nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1648-54 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 6, at 395-407; Kmiec, supra note 6, at 1648-52.
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lessen the risk of litigation;' (2) overregulation, as governments
have the incentive to deny development proposals altogether in
order to avoid heightened scrutiny;9 (3) inefficient outcomes, as
heightened scrutiny impairs the ability of governments and
developers to reach mutually beneficial arrangements; ° and (4) the
undermining of local democratic political processes."
We have elsewhere added our voices to the anti-Nollan-Dolan
chorus by noting the ways in which the opinions encourage the
trend toward greater privatization of local government funding. 2 In
applying heightened scrutiny and in concluding that the exactions
in both Nollan and Dolan constituted takings, the Court seems to
have hoped that its decisions would encourage governments to
attain their policy objectives through the use of general tax
revenues, rather than through exactions. 3 That hope has failed to
materialize. Part of the explanation for this failure has little to do
with the holdings and reasoning of the opinions and much to do with
the powerful forces and incentives that have been encouraging local
governments, for several decades now, to rely less on general
revenues and more on nontax sources such as exactions.' 4 But the
opinions themselves have, perhaps unintentionally, provided
incentives for further privatization of local government funding.'"
8. See Fennell, supra note 6, at 40-41; Fenster, supra note 6, at 655-58; see also Jonathan
M. Davidson et al., 'Where's Dolan?': Exactions Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAW. 683, 697 (1998)
(noting that after Dolan, "[tihe prospect of defending a takings challenge ... may lead to
increased capitulation, or perhaps to a negotiated development that is more compromising
than that initially proposed by planning staff").
9. See Dana, supra note 6, at 1249; Fennell, supra note 6, at 33-40; Fenster, supra note
6, at 662. The Court has held that the rough proportionality test announced in Dolan does not
apply to a denial of permission to develop. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999).
10. See Fennell, supra note 6, at 28-32.
11. See Fenster, supra note 6, at 668-78.
12. See Laurie Reynolds & Carlos A. Ball, Exactions and the Privatization of the Public
Sector, 21 J.L. & POL. 451 (2005).
13. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (concluding that if
the government wanted to require the plaintiffs to provide an easement, it would have to pay
for it).
14. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What You Pay For"
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004) (discussing ten factors that influence
local government decisions to use nontax sources and the resulting effect); Reynolds & Ball,
supra note 12, at 453-59.
15. See Reynolds & Ball, supra note 12, at 453-75.
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Despite the criticisms of Nollan and Dolan that we and others
have raised, we recognize that the constitutional framework
established by those two cases is firmly entrenched and is unlikely
to be overruled anytime soon. Furthermore, we recognize that
exactions do provide governments with an opportunity to leverage
their police powers in order to receive benefits from property owners
without having to pay for them. 6 As a result, we explore in this
Article how the Nollan-Dolan test can be reformed, rather than
argue that it should be overruled. Our goal is twofold. First, we seek
to preserve the protection that Nollan and Dolan established
against governmental overreaching and leveraging. Second, because
our primary concern is with the further narrowing of the sources of
local government funding, 7 we have a particular interest in
exploring how the Nollan-Dolan test can be modified to distribute
the burdens that exactions impose on landowners more broadly.
We begin in Part I with an exploration of local governments'
marked shift away from general tax revenues and toward a more
privatized funding model that depends on marketlike consumer
transactions for the provision of public infrastructure and services. 8
We also summarize the holdings and reasoning of the Court in
Nollan and Dolan.9 In Part II, we explore the prominent role that
the degree of burden distribution has played in the Court's takings
jurisprudence generally, and we criticize the Court for ignoring that
16. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994)
(-A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." (quoting Pa. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))). Under the Takings Clause, the government may reject
an owner's development proposal, as long as it does not unduly interfere with the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). As a practical matter, however, the denial of one particular form of
development when other, perhaps less intense, uses of the land are allowed will seldom effect
a taking. The considerable leeway that the government has in denying particular development
proposals, coupled with the fact that owners usually have a financial incentive to accede to
the exactions in order to proceed with development, means that owners are frequently under
some pressure to agree to provide the exactions. As a result, exactions raise the possibility
that the government may try to exact from the landowner more than what is constitutionally
permitted in the absence of just compensation.
17. See discussion infra Part I.A; see also Reynolds & Ball, supra note 12, at 453-59;
Reynolds, supra note 14, at 430-41 (discussing the negative impact of local government
reliance on nontax revenue).
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.
19. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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factor in its Nollan-Dolan analysis.20 As we explain, there is little in
the Nollan-Dolan test that encourages governments to distribute
exaction-related burdens widely, even though burden distribution
is one of the primary goals of the Takings Clause.21 The opinions,
then, lead perversely to the further concentration, rather than to the
further dissipation, of those burdens.
It is therefore ironic, but not surprising, that Nollan and Dolan,
although invalidating the exactions at issue in those cases, spawned
more, decidedly narrower exactions than the ones that came before
them.22 Local governments, seizing on language and distinctions
made in the two opinions, have scrambled to find new ways to
levy nontax charges that meet the Court's narrow essential nexus
and rough proportionality tests.' To undo what we view as this
problematic outcome, we urge in Part III that the Court extend
Nollan and Dolan to all local government exactions, replacing the
currently relevant distinctions between legislative and adjudicative
exactions, and between land and monetary exactions, with an
explicit analysis of the degree of burden distribution that accompa-
nies exaction programs.'
At this early stage of the Article, it is important to acknowledge
that our proposed expansion of the scope of Nollan-Dolan is likely
to encounter doctrinal and systemic criticisms. The first objection,
based on the reasoning of some courts, might be that Nollan-Dolan
should be limited to dedicatory exactions-that is, exactions that
require dedication of land, rather than payment of money-because
monetary exactions are somehow more "benign" than dedicatory
exactions.2 5 We concur with courts that have rejected this argument;
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. U.S. CONST. amend V. (guaranteeing that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation").
22. One study of exactions in California in the wake of Nollan and Dolan found that, in
many instances, community reliance on exactions and impact fees increased, rather than
decreased. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme
Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 103,
122-25 (2001). The authors found that result "surprising and counterintuitive," id. at 105,
because, after all, the Court invalidated the exactions challenged in both Nollan and Dolan.
23. Id. at 105.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997). For additional sources, see infra note 219.
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whether the requirement be that a landowner dedicate an acre of
land or pay an amount of money that equals the cost of an acre of
land, the ultimate impact on her is similar.26 Second, some have
justified restricting the purview of Nollan-Dolan to so-called
"adjudicative" exactions, thus excluding more broadly adopted
"legislative" exactions, because of the ways in which the former
provide an opportunity for government leveraging or extortion of
the landowner.2 Again, we believe that the logic behind this
distinction comes up short; governments can exercise leveraging
or extortionate behavior against a class of individuals, as well as
against a single individual.28 Third, to those who would criticize the
further constitutionalization of local government law, we recognize
that an expanded Nollan-Dolan standard would bring a greater
number of cases under the purview of federal constitutional law,
and we do not lightly conclude that state law should take a back
seat to its federal big brother. As a detailed review of state law
cases has shown, however, state courts have generally ignored,
reformulated, or abandoned state law limits on government nontax
revenue-raising devices.29 The creativity shown by local govern-
ments in devising narrow, targeted, nontax finance devices has far
outstripped the willingness of state courts to restore principled,
limited parameters for those devices. As a result, we conclude,
somewhat reluctantly, that a meaningful federal standard is the
only realistic option. 0
26. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 (Cal. 1996) (holding that the
Nollan-Dolan test applies to monetary exactions); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates
Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 639-40 (Tex. 2004) (same).
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part III.
29. See Reynolds, supra note 14, at 395-429; see also infra note 56 (providing examples of
the unwillingness of many courts to apply traditional common law limitations on the ability
of local governments to impose nontax revenue-raising devices).
30. It may seem that by rejecting the legislative-adjudicative and land-monetary
distinctions, we agree with commentators who seem to want to use Nollan-Dolan to impede
significantly the ability of governments to impose exactions. See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 6,
at 395-407 (arguing for an expansion of the essential nexus and rough proportionality
doctrines to limit all types of local government exactions). Although there is common ground
between us and those commentators on the need to eliminate the distinctions, our policy goals
are quite distinct. Our goal is not to make it considerably more difficult for governments to
impose exactions. Instead, we seek to encourage them to impose exactions that distribute
burdens widely, while discouraging them from imposing exactions on increasingly narrow
1520 [Vol. 47:1513
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We conclude the Article in Part IV with a discussion of the
specific ways in which the degree of burden distribution can be
incorporated into the constitutional analysis. Under our proposed
modification of the Nollan-Dolan test, courts would have to inquire
whether the exaction program in question is underinclusive, that is,
whether owners who are similarly situated to the plaintiff owner
are required to provide similar exactions.3 We also propose that
the benefits that accrue to owners from a wide distribution of
the burden be accounted for in the application of Dolan's rough
proportionality test.32
In the end, the choice is not between the current land use
regulation landscape, where exactions are common, and a different
landscape where exactions are never or infrequently imposed.
Instead, the question is whether the Nollan-Dolan test, as currently
understood and applied, gives courts the necessary analytical tools
to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate exactions.
We believe that the answer to that question is "no," which is why we
propose that the test be modified to account explicitly for the degree
of burden distribution that accompanies exactions.33
Our proposal here is part of a larger agenda-to restore a more
sensible balance between tax and nontax revenue-raising devices
used by local governments. Our proposed modification of the Nollan-
Dolan test takes an important first step in that direction-it seeks
to counter the privatizing forces of Nollan-Dolan, thus returning us
to a world where exactions, which are only one of many nontax
devices that are currently employed by governments at all levels,34
are based on a broader distribution of the burden across a larger
section of the population. From that point, we can then seek to
restore the balance between tax and nontax revenue-raising devices
more generally, a shift that will never happen, we argue, unless
local governments are required to turn away from their overreliance
on narrowly targeted revenue devices and return to distributing the
costs of government more broadly.
sections of the population.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
34. See Reynolds, supra note 14, at 397-429.
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I. EXACTIONS AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FUNDING
One of the primary purposes of the Takings Clause, as we explain
in Part II, is to distribute the property-related burdens imposed by
government regulations as widely as possible. 35 The trend in local
government financing over the last thirty years, however, has been
to narrow, or privatize, rather than to broaden, or collectivize, the
revenue sources needed to pay for infrastructure and services.36 This
change has occurred primarily because local governments have
reduced their reliance on general revenue taxes, which distribute
the obligation to pay for infrastructure and services as broadly as
possible, while they have simultaneously increased their use of
narrowly targeted revenue-raising devices such as exactions.37
There is some tension, therefore, between the Takings Clause's
goal of distributing property-related burdens broadly and local
governments' growing use of nontax sources of revenue. We argue
later in this Article that the Court should have addressed this
tension in Nollan and Dolan by assessing the constitutionality of
exactions partly in light of the degree to which they distribute
burdens among similarly situated owners.38 In this Part, we lay the
foundation for that argument.
A. A Brief (Critical) History of Nontax Revenue Raising by Local
Governments
In the first half of the nineteenth century, communities in the
United States began, with some frequency, to levy special assess-
ments to recoup the costs of providing street improvements adjacent
to properties that they had recently annexed.39 In a sense, then,
35. See discussion infra Part II.A.
36. See generally Reynolds, supra note 14, at 379-85 (discussing the rise of narrowly
targeted revenue-raising devices).
37. Id.
38. See discussion infra Part II.B.
39. A special assessment is a charge levied on property that will uniquely benefit from
particular government improvements, such as sidewalks, street lights, or sanitary sewers.
Judicially created tests and statutes typically require that the amount assessed be limited to
1522 [Vol. 47:1513
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special assessments were the earliest forms of exactions, imposed by
localities on a lot-by-lot basis as they grew in slow increments. Once
that "entrance fee" was paid, however, general revenues funded
further municipal improvements.4 °
As the pattern of residential construction changed from single-lot
developments to multilot subdivisions, and as the scope of municipal
infrastructure extended far beyond the provision of street improve-
ments, community regulation changed as well. Exactions as we
know them today grew out of local subdivision ordinances enacted
in the early twentieth century.4' As originally conceived, subdivision
regulations served the primary purpose of making the recordation
of land titles more efficient.42 Subsequently, with the publication of
the Standard City Planning Enabling Act' in 1928, the regulations
expanded to include the concept of requiring the subdivider to
provide internal improvements, such as streets and open spaces.
44
The vast increase in demand for housing after World War II,4 and
the accompanying explosive growth of residential subdivisions, led
local governments to expand the scope of regulations even further
by requiring subdividers to contribute to off-site improvements such
as parks, roads, and schools.
46
Local governments, then, have long used individualized, property-
specific charges to meet infrastructure needs created by land
development and growth. Until the 1970s, however, the use of
the value of the special benefit enjoyed by the burdened property. See Reynolds, supra note
14, at 397-402. For a history of the use of special assessments in the United States in the
nineteenth century, see Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit
Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983).
40. See Diamond, supra note 39, at 238. Diamond notes that "[olnce that entrance fee into
the municipal general tax pool had been paid, public financing of additional improvements
would follow; the further distribution ofcosts and benefits would in the aggregate be assumed
to be fair." Id.
41. See ROBERT H. FREILICH & MICHAEL M. SHULTZ, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS:
PLANNING AND LAw 1 (2d ed. 1995).
42. See id.
43. ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD
CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928), available at httpJ/www.planning.org/growingsmart/
pdf/CPEnablingAct1928.pdf.
44. FREILICH & SHULTZ, supra note 41, at 2.
45. For a description of the ways in which the housing market responded to a shortage of
approximately six million housing units in 1947, see KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 231-45 (1985).
46. See FREILICH & SHULTZ, supra note 41, at 2-3.
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nontax financing techniques was limited to a small percentage of
overall municipal revenues.47 The vast majority of revenues derived
locally came from general taxes, levied uniformly on the entire
taxpaying population." During the two decades before the Supreme
Court articulated its Nollan-Dolan test, however, there was a
marked increase in the use of nontax charges by local governments
to pay for the provision of basic municipal infrastructure and
services.49
In the particular realm of exactions, the post-1970 increase in the
use of nontax revenue-raising devices led to yet another expansion
of subdivision regulations, requiring more extensive subdivider
contributions to a wider range of capital infrastructure projects and
services. 0 In addition, municipalities began to impose "social
exactions" that required subdividers, for example, to provide, or help
pay for, affordable housing."' The result of all of this was that "[a]
virtual revolution in exaction utilization took place in the 1970s and
1980s. " 2
Although there are multiple explanations for the dramatic
increase in the use of nontax charges such as exactions, three are
47. See ALAN A. ALTsHULER & JoSe A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ WITH ARNOLD M. HOWITT,
REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 18-19 (1993).
48. Id. at 8.
49. In 1957, approximately eighty percent of total locally derived revenues came from
taxes, with only twenty percent resulting from charges, assessments, and other fees. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPIt OF COMMERCE, 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, VOL. 4, No. 3,
HISTORICAL SUMMARYOF GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN THE UNITED STATES 22 tbl.6 (1958). By
1997 the use of nontax revenues had increased to thirty-eight percent. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, VOL. 4, No. 5,
COMPENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES 2 tbl.2 (2005). The figures mask the much greater
real reduction in tax funding that is represented by the enormous growth in special districts,
most of which rely heavily, if not exclusively, on nontax techniques. Between 1952 and 1997,
the number of special purpose governments nearly tripled. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, VOL. 1, No. 1, GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION 6 tbl.5 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS]. In addition, the
municipal revenue figures do not include in-kind developer contributions of streets, sidewalks,
and other basic infrastructure. See ALTSHULER ET AL., supra note 47, at 16.
50. See ALTSHULER ETAL., supra note 47, at 35-41; see also FREILICH& SHULTZ, supra note
41, at 6 ("The concept of making development pay its own way now goes beyond the mere
dedication of parkland and school sites. It includes contribution to the cost of providing all
publicly produced benefits-roads, police and fire services, medical services, water and sewer
services, libraries, and more." (footnote omitted)).
51. See ALTSHULER ET AL., supra note 47, at 42-46.
52. Id. at 34.
1524
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particularly salient. First, beginning in California with the passage
of Proposition XIII in 1978, 53 numerous taxpayer revolts imposed
stringent tax limits on government at all levels.' Second, the
public's attitude toward growth experienced a significant shift. The
emerging antigrowth movement saw development as burdensome
to the community, creating political pressure on municipalities to
increase the contributions required of developers.55 Finally, state
courts became more willing to ignore traditional common law
limitations on the ability of local governments to implement
revenue-raising devices such as special assessments, user fees,
and other individualized nontax charges.5" As a result, with taxing
powers severely limited, communities clamoring for growth to
"pay its own way,"17 and growing judicial unwillingness to limit the
ability of governments to use nontax financing techniques, local
53. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A.
54. Within several years of California's adoption of Proposition XIII, forty-three states
adopted new limits on government's taxation powers. See generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT &
LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 595-600
(6th ed. 2004) (discussing tax and expenditure limits in different states).
55. See ALTSHULER ET AL., supra note 47, at 18-20.
56. Although judicial tests traditionally limited special assessments to one-time charges
for infrastructure that both created a special benefit for the property assessed and were
calculated to recoup no more than the value of the special benefit, special assessments are
now used to fund general community-wide services and system improvements. See, e.g., Knox
v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 152 (Cal. 1992) (upholding a special assessment for
maintenance of existing public parks); Sossoman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 630 P.2d 1154,
1159 (Kan. 1981) (upholding use of a special assessment and rejecting the argument that the
method improperly ignored the special benefit criterion); Purdy v. City of York, 500 N.W.2d
841, 845 (Neb. 1993) (upholding a special assessment for benefits "including enhanced fire
protection, lower insurance rates, enhanced water quality, economical water service, and
enhanced property values"). Furthermore, voluntariness, a requirement that views fees as
payments by those who willingly use government services, has frequently been ignored. See,
e.g., Hochstedler v. St. Joseph County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (approving a mandatory recycling charge as a permissible fee, despite plaintiffs
nonparticipation in the recycling program); Rogers v. Oktibbeha County Bd. of Supervisors,
749 So. 2d 966, 969 (Miss. 1999) (upholding mandatory garbage disposal fees levied on those
who did not use system). Similarly, although traditional judge-created tests require, for
instance, that fees provide a "special benefit" to the payer, some courts have allowed
municipalities to use the special assessment technique to generate revenues for general
municipal services such as fire and flood protection. See, e.g., Dean v. Town of Addison, 534
S.E.2d 403, 407-08 (W. Va. 2000) (upholding user fees for provision of fire services); City of
Clarksburg v. Grandeotto, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 177, 182 (W. Va. 1998) (upholding municipal fire
and flood protection fees). For elaboration on the evolution of the judicial tests, see Reynolds,
supra note 14, at 399-402 (discussing special assessments), 409-15 (discussing user fees).
57. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 395.
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governments increasingly turned to those techniques for greater
portions of their revenues. 8 These trends coincided with a decrease
in federal government aid as a percentage of local budgets,59 a
substantial reduction in the proportion of core infrastructure
expenses funded at the federal level,6" an increase in state and
federal mandates for local government provision of services and
infrastructure,6 ' and years of deferred maintenance accumulating
at the local level.62 It is no surprise, therefore, that local govern-
ments seized the opportunity to fund budget shortfalls with revenue
sources that went beyond traditional taxes.
The changes in local government financing are significant
because they represent a move away from a system in which the
costs of government are paid by most of the community through
general taxation. This more collectivized financing system engen-
ders communal responsibility and allocates government revenues
through the give-and-take of the municipal budgeting process. In its
stead, the shift to nontax financing has ushered in a more privatized
system for the provision of infrastructure and services, one in
which individual citizens contribute revenues according to their
consumption or the burdens that their activities impose on the
community.
Governments' increasing reliance on nontax revenue-raising
devices has had numerous negative policy consequences. Three such
consequences are objective and capable of measurement; others
are far less tangible, but are, we argue, at least as problematic.
First, the increase in nontax financing has led to an inevitable
increase in spending on the types of projects that can be funded by
58. For elaboration on these factors, see id. at 392-96.
59. Between 1976 and 1997, federal government aid to local governments decreased from
eight percent of total municipal budgets to about four percent. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, VOL. 4, No. 5, COMPENDIUM OF
GOVERNMENT FINANCES 23 tbl.2, with 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 49, at 5
tbl.5.
60. In the mid-1960s, the federal government paid for one-half of core infrastructure
expenses nationwide, including highways, transportation, water, and sewer. By the end of the
1980s, that figure had declined to one-sixth. See ALTSHULER ET AL., supra note 47, at 128.
61. See id. at 31-32.
62. Although the decline in infrastructure spending began in the 1960s, the deterioration
did not reach crisis proportions until the mid-1980s because high-quality capital
improvements can withstand a fair amount of neglect. See id. at 26-31.
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nontax revenue-raising techniques, producing an emphasis on
"things" at the expense of "people."63 Local government spending, in
other words, has shifted toward large capital improvements and
infrastructure, such as major transportation expenditures and
water and sewer facilities, while spending on social services has
decreased.6"
Second, and relatedly, when nontax funds are earmarked and
segregated from general municipal revenues, they consume a
greater percentage of total available dollars than if the projects
formed part of the municipal budget because they are not subject
to the give-and-take of the general budgeting process.' In the
increasingly privatized world of local government financing,
revenue streams are segregated, and no general community debate
establishes priorities for all expenditures or makes the hard choices
between, for instance, whether the government should modernize its
sewage treatment plant or, alternatively, fund a promising innova-
tive treatment program for juvenile offenders. With nontax revenues
constituting a large share of the budget, that debate does not take
place, and no local official is put in the position of having to choose
between the two. If the sewage plant is built, it will inevitably be
financed through many nontax sources, with its revenues removed
from the general municipal budget and pledged specifically to that
project. As the big-ticket items of local government spending are
financed through increasingly privatized sources, what is left for the
general revenues budget debate is the allocation of money for social
services and important, but limited, public goods such as police and
fire services.
Finally, because nontax devices are individualized charges
computed by an assessment of usage or cost imposed by the payer,
they tend toward an increase in service inequality because those
63. Henry Cisneros, the former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, made the same observation in a different context, noting how regional
cooperation efforts often focus on "things-regionalism" when what is really needed is a focus
on "people-regionalism." HENRY G. CISNEROS, REGIONALISM: THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF
OPPORTUNITY 8-9 (1995).
64. See KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENT
222-24 (1997) (noting that as reliance on targeted funding increases, spending on social
welfare decreases).
65. For an elaboration on this phenomenon, see id. at 189-214.
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with higher levels of wealth can afford higher levels of government
services. The government, in turn, must either accept this inequal-
ity or find alternative ways to subsidize the usage of government
services by those who are unable to pay.
Although these trends are worrisome by themselves, we believe
that other, more ephemeral, consequences of the shift in funding
are at least as problematic because they affect the very fabric of
local governments and their relationships with their citizens. As
governments increase the number of fees and other nontax devices
that they levy, citizens are bombarded by new charges at every turn.
And as citizens pay those bills, as they pay for everything else, they
begin to feel like consumers participating in a market economy, with
consequent subtle attitudinal shifts. Increasingly, citizens apply the
same scrutiny to their payments to the government that they use to
evaluate potential purchases of commodities in the marketplace;
they expect, in other words, to "get what they pay for." Although it
is not unreasonable to expect that the government provide services
efficiently and competently, it is quite another matter to equate
government services with private consumer purchases.66 When that
happens, the government ceases to be the conduit through which
basic services are provided to all and paid for by the contributions
of all who are able. Instead, the government becomes a provider of
services for only those who can afford them.
66. From the taxpayer's vantage point, the long and growing list of nontax charges for
which she pays may create the sense that she has "paid her own way." In reality, however,
few government services are funded entirely by operating revenues; they typically depend on
a significant investment of general government revenues, particularly in the start-up phase
involving acquisition of land and construction of infrastructure. For elaboration on this "myth
of self sufficiency," see Reynolds, supra note 14, at 437-38.
Nontax devices are also incapable of fully accounting for all of the costs of growth and new
development, including environmental and aesthetic impacts, reduction in open space,
incrementally longer commutes to work, and the social isolation and economic segregation
caused by the divide between city and suburb. See Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The
Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY
137, 143 (1999); Nick Rosenberg, Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost
Internalization Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641, 647-49 (2003).
Although these costs are "often undervalued or even ignored," the mathematical formula on
which the fees are based may create the impression that a precise quid pro quo has been
levied. Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21st Century, 23 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REv. 705, 711 (1999) (discussing the "hidden costs" of growth).
1528 [Vol. 47:1513
EXACTIONS AND BURDEN DISTRIBUTION
Furthermore, the proliferation of nontax devices may have the
unintended consequence of exacerbating the antitax attitudes that
encouraged the government to levy nontax charges in the first place.
As citizens increasingly perceive that they pay directly for the
services that they use through a long list of fees and other charges,
they begin to assume that taxes are only meant to fund services for
those who cannot pay for them. This leads to a shift in perspective
on the part of the citizenry, from an "all in it together" to a "what's
in it for me" mentality, with a corresponding decrease in the
citizens' willingness to contribute, through taxes, to a broad range
of infrastructure and services.67
B. The Court's Exaction Cases
Given the marked increase in the use of exactions beginning in
the 1970s, it was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court
agreed to review constitutional challenges to them, as it did in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission" and Dolan v. City of
Tigard."9 The exactions at issue in those cases are examples of the
general trend noted in the previous subpart: the governments
attempted to attain otherwise legitimate public purposes, such as
providing public access to beaches 70 and addressing problems
associated with flooding and traffic congestion, 71 not through the
expenditure of general tax revenues, but instead through the
imposition of conditions on individual property owners that had to
be met before development could proceed.
The property owners in Nollan submitted a development proposal
to the California Coastal Commission to increase the size of the
67. Others have noted the strength and breadth of the antitax sentiment. See, e.g.,
Reynolds, supra note 14, at 438-39 (discussing how nontax revenue-raising devices increase
antitax sentiments); Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and
Local Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property
Tax as a Case In Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 521-27 (2002) (discussing tax reform
efforts and taxpayer reaction); Kirk J. Stark, The Right To Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
191, 197-203 (2001) (discussing the property tax revolt in California and its relation to direct
democracy).
68. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
69. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
70. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
71. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80.
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dwelling located on their beachfront property.72 The Commission
was concerned that the new and larger house on the Nollans'
property would contribute to the formation of "a 'wall' of residential
structures" that would create a psychological barrier between
members of the public and the beach areas that they were entitled
to visit.7 3 The Commission was also concerned that the larger house
would lead to greater private use of the public beachfront.74 In order
to address both of these issues, the Commission approved the
development proposal, conditioned on the Nollans' willingness to
provide the public with the right to walk along the part of their
property located between their seawall and the mean high tide
mark.75
The Court concluded that the exaction demanded by the
Commission constituted a taking because there was no "essential
nexus" between the state's goals and the nature of the exaction. 76 As
a result, the exaction constituted nothing more than an attempt by
the government to acquire an easement without having to pay for
it. 77 The Court noted that when a condition on development does not
serve the purpose that the government claims, the condition
becomes nothing more than "an out-and-out plan of extortion."78 The
Court reasoned that it needed to be "particularly careful" in cases
where the government requires conveyance of a property interest as
a condition for approval of the development proposal.79 In these
types of cases, "there is heightened risk that the [government's]
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than
72. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
73. Id. at 828-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 829.
75. Id. at 828-29.
76. Id. at 837.
77. Id. at 839-41. The Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the government's
interests in preventing the formation of a psychological barrier to beach access, as well as in
reducing congestion caused by greater private use of the public beachfront, were legitimate.
Id. at 835. The Court concluded, however, that "it is quite impossible to understand how a
requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house." Id. at 838.
The Court also reasoned that the easement required of the Nollans did not "help[] to remedy
any additional congestion ... caused by construction of the Nollans' new house." Id. at 838-39.
78. Id. at 837 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
79. Id. at 841.
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the stated police-power objective."0 Although California was free to
pursue its goal of promoting public access to beaches, it had to pay
the Nollans for the easement.8 "
Dolan v. City of Tigard,82 the Court's second major exaction case,
was decided seven years after Nollan. The property owner in Dolan
requested permission to increase the size of her hardware store,
located in the central business district of Tigard, Oregon.83 The city
conditioned its approval of the project on two requirements: first, it
asked that Dolan dedicate a strip of land located in the floodplain to
facilitate municipal improvement of the storm drainage system;'
second, the city required her to provide an additional strip of land
for use as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway to reduce vehicular traffic
in the central section of the city. 5 Dolan sued the city, arguing that
the exactions constituted takings.86
The Court began its analysis by noting the difference between
land use regulations that "involve[] essentially legislative determi-
nations classifying entire areas of the city" and the type of
"adjudicative decision" reached by the city in Dolan "to condition
[the owner's] application for a building permit on an individual
parcel."87 By drawing this distinction, the Court suggested that
adjudicative exactions are more suspect than legislative land use
regulations because the former involve decisions made by the
government as they relate to only one parcel.8
The Court then noted that the facts met Nollan's essential nexus
test.89 The analysis did not end there, however, because the Court
80. Id.
81. Id. at 841-42.
82. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
83. See id. at 379.
84. Id. at 380-81.
85. Id. at 381-82.
86. See id. at 382-83.
87. Id. at 385.
88. See id. For a full discussion of the Court's distinction between legislative land use
regulations and adjudicative exactions, see infra Part III.A.
89. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387. Specifically, Dolan's proposed redevelopment would have
increased the likelihood of flooding because it would have led to an increase in the size of
impervious surfaces. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that an essential nexus existed
between the city's goal of preventing flooding along the creek that ran through Dolan's
property and the floodplain easement required of her. Id. The Court also noted that Dolan's
larger hardware store, by accommodating more merchandise and customers, would have led
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proceeded to require that the city show a "rough proportionality"
between the impact of Dolan's redevelopment and the easements
required of her. 0 This meant that "the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication[s] [are]
related in both nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."9
The exaction involving the floodplain easement failed to satisfy
this level of scrutiny because the city's flood-prevention objectives
were attainable by simply prohibiting development in the floodplain
area.92 It was not necessary to add the further requirement that
Dolan dedicate an easement to the city-a requirement that
deprived her of the important right to exclude. 93 In the end, the
Court concluded that "[tihe city ... never said why a public
greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest
of flood control."94
As for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, the city's finding that the
pathway "could offset some of the traffic demand ... and lessen the
increase in traffic congestion" was constitutionally insufficient. 9
Although the Court made it clear that "[no precise mathematical
calculation is required," some effort to quantify both the proposed
to an increase in vehicular traffic. Id. at 395. There was, therefore, a sufficient nexus between
the goal of reducing traffic congestion in the central business district and the easement
required of Dolan for use as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. Id.
90. Id. at 391. The Court explicitly placed "the burden on the city to justify the required
dedication." Id. at 391 n.8.
91. Id. at 391. The Court arrived at the rough proportionality test after reviewing the
ways in which state courts had previously assessed the constitutionality of exactions. See id.
at 389-91. It noted that "[iun some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary
connection between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice,"
while in others a much more "exacting correspondence, described as the 'specifi[c] and
uniquely attributable' test," is required. Id. at 389 (alteration in original) (quoting Pioneer
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)). The first
standard was "too lax" and the second was too "exacting." Id. at 389-90. The Court preferred
the approach taken by a third group of jurisdictions, which "require[d] the municipality to
show a 'reasonable relationship' between the required dedication and the impact of the
proposed development." Id. at 390. The Court, however, preferred to articulate the standard
as one calling for a "rough proportionality" rather than a "reasonable relationship," in order
to avoid confusing the test required under the Takings Clause with the highly deferential
rational basis test applied under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 391.
92. See id. at 392-93.
93. Id. at 393.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 395 (omission in original) (emphasis added).
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development's impact on traffic and the offsetting benefits of the
pathway was necessary."
Our criticism of Nollan and Dolan in this Article is not based on
what the Court did, but rather on what it failed to do. We do not, in
other words, take issue here with the Court's adoption of the
essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. Instead, we believe
that the Court should have also explicitly addressed the issue of
burden distribution in assessing the constitutionality of the
challenged exactions. From a policy perspective, the Court's
opinions failed to account for the effects of the marked shift in local
government funding away from sources that distribute burdens
widely, such as general revenue taxes, and toward other sources
that seek to privatize and narrow the burdens, such as exactions. s7
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court's constitutional analysis
improperly ignored the need to distribute burdens widely, which is
one of the primary goals of the Takings Clause.
II. BURDEN DISTRIBUTION AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Takings law generally seeks to balance the benefits that
government regulations confer on the public against the burdens
that they impose on property owners. Although the Court has not
done so explicitly, we believe it is helpful to distinguish between
the verticality and horizontality of those burdens."8 A burden's
verticality speaks to its severity; its horizontality speaks to the
degree to which the burden is distributed among property owners.
The vertical analysis, in other words, focuses on how any given
owner is individually affected by the regulation at issue. The
horizontal analysis, on the other hand, focuses on how any given
owner is burdened relative to other similarly situated landowners.9
96. Id. at 395-96.
97. See discussion supra Part I.A.
98. The Court in the recent case of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2084
(2005), noted for the first time what we refer to in this Article as the distinction between the
verticality and the horizontality of the burden imposed on property owners by regulations. For
a discussion of Lingle, see infra notes 165, 176.
99. Another way of conceptualizing the distinction between the vertical and horizontal
analyses is by thinking of the former as capturing the component of takings law that is more
like a substantive due process analysis because it looks to the degree of governmental
interference with the underlying right. In contrast, the latter is akin to an equal protection
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The horizontal analysis, in short, adds a crucial relational compo-
nent to takings law.100
The Takings Clause is meant, in part, to distribute the burdens
imposed on owners by governmental regulations as broadly as
possible. The Court made this point most succinctly and famously
forty-five years ago in Armstrong v. United States,'0 ' where it noted
that one of the primary purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."0 2 This language, which is known as the Armstrong
principle,"3 has been endorsed in almost every important takings
opinion of the last thirty years, both by Justices who contended that
the regulations before the Court amounted to takings, as well as by
those who disagreed."° In fact, it is fair to say that the Armstrong
analysis because it compares the government's regulation of the plaintiff to its regulation of
similarly situated individuals.
100. Professor John Fee argues that property rights under the Takings Clause are best
understood as comparative rights. See John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative
Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2003). He argues, in effect, that the Takings Clause is
an equality or antidiscrimination provision. Id. As Fee puts it, "[tihe proper role of the
Takings Clause is to require compensation in those circumstances where the government
legitimately targets merely one or a few owners to bear a unique legal burden for the benefit
of the general community." Id. We are sympathetic to Fee's understanding of the Takings
Clause. It is not our position in this Article, however, that burden distribution is the only
purpose of the Clause. Instead, we argue that burden distribution is one of its primary goals.
101. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
102. Id. at 49.
103. See William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narrative of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1153 (1997).
104. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 303-04 (2002); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988); id. at 19 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,835
n.4 (1987); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512-13 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986); San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
123-24 (1978); id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1534
EXACTIONS AND BURDEN DISTRIBUTION
principle is one of the few concepts associated with takings law on
which there seems to be a strong and ongoing agreement among
members of the Court.
The degree to which the burden imposed by land use regulations
is distributed among property owners is important for at least three
reasons. First, and most obviously, if the government imposes a
burden on one owner, or on a small number of owners, then it is
more likely that it is unfairly asking a few to pay for benefits
conferred on many.
Second, demanding that the burden be distributed as widely as
possible makes it less likely that the government will act in an
arbitrary manner. It makes it less likely, in other words, that the
government will single out one owner, or a small number of owners,
for illegitimate reasons.0 5 The importance of widely distributing the
burdens imposed on owners by land use regulations is reflected, for
example, in the prohibition against "reverse spot zoning."1"' Such
zoning impermissibly "singles out a particular parcel for different,
less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.
Third, it is more likely that owners of burdened lands will
enjoy the benefits of a land use regulation when the government
distributes the burdens broadly. For example, when an area of a
municipality is zoned for residential purposes only, all of the owners
105. See, e.g., C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d
143, 151 (Pa. 2002). Saul Levmore has argued that burden distribution is important because
the greater the distribution, the more likely that the affected owners will be able to protect
their interests through participation in the political process, reducing the need for judicial
intervention. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285,308-
14(1990).
106. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 246 (4th ed. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
107. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132. For cases in which courts have found the differential
treatment of similarly situated owners to constitute reverse spot zoning, see, for example, In
re City of Miami Beach v. Robbins, 702 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); City
Comm'n of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1234-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); and Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 730-32 (Pa. 2003). Some
courts have held that reverse spot zoning effects a taking. See, e.g., Woodlawn Park, 553 So.
2d at 1235. Under the U.S. Constitution, the same is true of spot zoning, which impermissibly
singles out a particular parcel of land for preferential, as opposed to unfavorable, treatment.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1073 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that "spot zoning is ... likely
to constitute a taking") (internal quotation marks omitted); Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d
1127, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a spot zoning claim must be analyzed as a takings
claim, rather than as a substantive due process claim).
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in the district are burdened to the extent that they will no longer
have the opportunity to use their properties for commercial or
industrial purposes. Those same burdened owners, however, will
enjoy corresponding benefits that result from the fact that their
neighbors are similarly burdened.' The relationship between
burdens and benefits that accompany land use regulations, referred
to by the Court as the "average reciprocity of advantage," makes it
likely that a wider distribution of the burden will translate into
some offsetting benefits for affected owners."0 9
In Part II.A below, we explore more specifically the role that the
degree of burden distribution has played in cases in which the Court
has applied a categorical takings rule, as well as in cases in which
it has preferred an explicitly ad hoc analysis. In doing so, we seek
to separate analytically the questions related to the horizontality of
the burden from those related to its verticality. In Part II.B, we
return to the Nollan-Dolan framework and criticize it for ignoring
the issue of burden distribution.
108. For example, the area will be free of busy shopping centers that attract scores of
visitors and of factories that emit noise and soot pollution.
109. As the Court has noted, "Under our system of government, one of the State's primary
ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their
property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit
greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491; see also
Cochran v. Preston, 70 A. 113, 114-15 (Md. 1908) (discussing how a zoning ordinance that
limits the height of buildings confers reciprocal benefits on affected owners); State ex. rel.
Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451,453 (Wis. 1923) (reasoning that the owner "who is limited in
the use of his property finds compensation therefor in the benefits accruing to him from the
like limitations imposed upon his neighbor").
The term "average reciprocity of advantage" comes from Justice Holmes' opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Professor John Fee has noted that
"[t]he reciprocity of advantage concept suggests that the regulatory takings doctrine is focused
on discriminatory governmental action." Fee, supra note 100, at 1040. He adds that "[1laws
of sufficient general applicability do not require compensation because the legal burdens are
shared among a community of landowners for their collective benefit." Id. We elaborate on the
reciprocity of advantage concept as it relates to the degree of burden distribution that is part
of exaction programs in the discussion infra Parts II.B.3 and IV.B.
1536
EXACTIONS AND BURDEN DISTRIBUTION
A. Burden Distribution in Takings Law
1. Categorical Cases
In three types of cases, the Court has created a categorical rule
that mandates the finding of a taking. Under current doctrine, a
taking always occurs when the government (1) physically appropri-
ates property, (2) physically occupies property in a permanent
fashion, or (3) deprives property of all of its economic value. The
degree of burden distribution is relevant in all three types of cases.
a. Physical Appropriations
When the state exercises its eminent domain powers, it usually
singles out one or several owners and imposes a burden on them
that it does not impose on other owners. Thus, for example, when
the government takes land to build a library or a school, it targets
only one or a handful of owners and requires them to make their
properties available for public use and benefit.
The same can be true when the scale of the government project is
much larger-for example, when it builds a road or highway. While
in those cases, the total number of affected properties is not always
small, the percentage of affected properties, when compared to the
total number of nearby properties that benefit from the road or
highway, is typically quite small. The fact that the exercise of the
state's eminent domain powers usually requires the singling out of
some owners for the imposition of a burden in order to benefit others
is an important factor in supporting the well-settled notion that
such an exercise always constitutes a taking.
The Supreme Court's eminent domain cases have highlighted the
lack of burden distribution that typically accompanies the govern-
ment's exercise of its condemnation power. The Court's opinion in
the 1893 case of Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States," 0 for
example, noted that the Takings Clause
prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than
his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when
110. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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he surrenders to the public something more and different from
that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full
and just equivalent shall be returned to him."'
Seventy years later, the Court's famous articulation of the
Armstrong principle also emerged from an eminent domain case. 2
Of course, the verticality of the burden on a landowner caused by
condemnation is always quite severe, independent of how other
similarly situated owners are treated. A broader distribution of the
burden, in other words, is unlikely to save a condemnation from
constituting a taking. Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that
the narrow degree of burden distribution that is usually present in
eminent domain cases is an additional important factor in under-
standing why the state's exercise of its eminent domain powers
constitutes a per se taking.
b. Permanent Physical Occupations
The Supreme Court held in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.13 that when the government permanently occupies
private property, it effects a per se taking."4 The Court in Loretto
emphasized that when the government occupies property in a
permanent fashion, the vertical burden on the landowner is almost
as severe as when the government physically takes property from
the owner." 5 In permanent occupation cases, the owner is deprived
of the right to possess, use, and sell the occupied parts of the
property as a result of the state action." 6 The destruction of the
right to possess, the Court added, means that the owner also
loses the right to exclude." 7 As a result, the Court reasoned that a
111. Id. at 325.
112. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (holding that the government's
exercise of contractual rights to take title to boats did not remove its obligation to pay just
compensation for liens asserted against the boats).
113. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
114. Id. at 434-35. The rule also applies to permanent physical occupations by a third party
acting pursuant to government authority. See id.
115. Id. at 435-36.
116. Id. The Court explained that although the owner retains "the bare legal right to
dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale," such a right lacks any real value given that
"the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property." Id. at 436.
117. Id. at 435-36. The Court noted that the right to exclude "has traditionally been
[Vol. 47:15131538
EXACTIONS AND BURDEN DISTRIBUTION
permanent physical occupation constitutes a taking, regardless of
the extent of that occupation or the public benefits that might flow
from it.,,,
Perhaps due to the severity of the vertical burden that is usually
present, the Court in physical invasion cases has rarely addressed
matters related to the horizontal distribution of the burden.
However, the same narrow distribution of the burden that is usually
present in eminent domain cases is also typically present in physical
invasion cases.
The owner in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States,"9 for example, operated a beachfront hotel on property that
was adjacent to a fort owned by the military.2 ° The owner based its
takings claim on the fact that the government fired large guns over
the plaintiffs property several times a year and that, in addition,
the government established fire control operations on the owner's
property.' 2 ' The Supreme Court upheld the owner's claim, empha-
sizing the verticality of the burden that the government's actions
imposed on the private landowner.'22
Although the Court did not state so, the principle that it an-
nounced thirty years earlier in Monongahela Navigation- namely,
that the Takings Clause prohibits the government from singling out
one owner and imposing burdens on it in order to benefit the
public' 2 -was also applicable in Portsmouth Harbor. From the facts
stated in the opinion, it appears that the plaintiffs land was the
only property subjected to a physical invasion by the government."
The owner in Portsmouth Harbor was subjected to a unique burden
that was not shared by others, and that alone should have made the
government action suspect under the Takings Clause. 2 '
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights." Id. at
435 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)).
118. See id. at 436-37.
119. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
120. Id. at 328.
121. Id. at 329.
122. Id. The Court noted that "It] here is no doubt that a serious loss has been inflicted upon
the claimant, as the public has been frightened off the premises by the imminence of the
guns." Id.
123. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
124. See Portsmouth Harbor, 260 U.S. at 328.
125. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that government
should not force some owners to bear the public's burden); Monongahela Navigation, 148 U.S.
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The same can be said of the government's actions in United States
v. Causby.26 The plaintiff in Causby lived and operated a chicken
farm on land located next to a runway that the U.S. government
leased for military flights.'27 The noise from the low-flying airplanes
so frightened and upset the chickens that the plaintiff was required
to close his business.'28 Again, the Court concluded that the govern-
ment's actions constituted a taking because of the vertical degree of
the burden, that is, because of the severe impact of those actions on
the owner's use of his land. 2 s
As in Portsmouth Harbor, the Court in Causby did not emphasize
the unique burden placed on the plaintiff owner compared to other
owners in the area. Causby, like Portsmouth Harbor, however, is a
case where one owner was burdened by the government in ways
that his neighbors were not. The military airplanes undoubtedly
flew over the properties of nearby owners in order to land at the
airport in question. Yet, because of its proximity to the runway,
Causby's property experienced a unique burden as compared to his
neighbors' properties. Thus, although the Court chose to focus on
the severity of the vertical burden imposed by the government's
action on the landowners, the facts of both Portsmouth Harbor and
Causby reveal that the government in those cases singled out the
plaintiffs for a burden that it did not impose on nearby owners.130
at 325 (stating that one individual cannot be forced to bear "more than his just share of the
burdens of government").
126. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
127. Id. at 258.
128. Id. at 259.
129. See id. (holding that the government had destroyed the land's value and taken an
easement over the property).
130. Although the issue of burden distribution frequently goes unnoticed in physical
occupation cases, the Court did explicitly address the issue in Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). The plaintiff in Richards owned property adjacent to
tracks owned by a railroad company and next to the entrance to a railroad tunnel. Id. at 548-
49. Congress granted the defendant railroad company the power of eminent domain to acquire
land for its facilities. Id. at 550-52. Contending that the operation of the railroad near his
property constituted a "nuisance," the plaintiff sued the railroad company. Id. at 548. The
Supreme Court distinguished the smoke, dust, cinders, and vibrations caused by the operation
of the railroad from the gasses and smoke that wafted onto the plaintiffs property as a result
of the ventilation system in the tunnel. Id. at 554-57. As to the former, there could be no claim
because of the well-established rule that railroads were not liable for the effects of their
operations on nearby owners in the absence of negligence. Id. at 554-55. The Court added that
[amny diminution of the value of property not directly invaded nor peculiarly
affected, but sharing in the common burden of incidental damages arising from
[Vol. 47:15131540
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In the end, takings cases that involve physical invasions usually
reflect the same type of narrow distribution of the burden that is
typically present in eminent domain cases.' 3 ' The concerns behind
the Armstrong principle, in other words, are as applicable in
physical invasion cases as they are in cases involving the physical
taking of property.3 2
the legalized nuisance, is held not to be a "taking" within the constitutional
provision. The immunity is limited to such damages as naturally and
unavoidably result from the proper conduct of the road and are shared generally
by property owners whose lands lie within range of the inconveniences
necessarily incident to proximity to a railroad.
Id. at 554 (emphases added). For the Court, however, it was a different matter altogether
when it came to those damages that were unique to the plaintiff property owner. Id. at 553-57.
The burden suffered by the owner as a result of the gasses and smoke emitted from the tunnel
was not shared widely by other owners in the area; instead, the burden was a form of "special
and peculiar damage to the plaintiff as a property owner in close proximity to the portal." Id.
at 557. The Court concluded that "the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment
... [could not be construed to] authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and
substantial a burden upon plaintiffs property without compensation to him." Id.
Admittedly, the Court in Richards did not view the case as one involving the physical
invasion of the plaintiffs property. But what is interesting, for our purposes, about the Court's
holding and reasoning is that the Court placed a great deal of weight on the degree of burden
distribution. Activities related to the operation of the railroad, as authorized by Congress,
that led to harms "shared generally by property owners," did not give rise to a takings claim.
Id. at 554. In contrast, railroad activities that imposed "special and peculiar" burdens on the
plaintiffs property did rise to the level of a taking. Id. at 557. For a further discussion of
Richards from a burden distribution perspective, see Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection
of Nuisance and Takings Law (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the authors).
131. Loretto seems to be an exception. Loretto, who owned an apartment building in New
York City, was required by a state statute to allow the defendant cable company to place cable
equipment on her property in order to enable her tenants to access cable services from their
apartments. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,423 (1982). The
statute at issue applied to all owners of residential rental property in the state. Id. at 423 n.3
(reproducing the statute requiring that "[nlo landlord shall ... interfere with the installation
of cable television facilities upon his property"). Given that the statute in Loretto applied to
thousands of owners across the state, it seems difficult to argue persuasively that the plaintiff
was burdened in a special or unique way. Loretto, therefore, seems to be a case where, despite
the government's wide horizontal distribution of the burden, the magnitude or verticality of
that burden led the Court to find a taking. Nevertheless, Loretto is sometimes used to support
the idea that the application of a land use regulation to a narrow class of owners constitutes
a taking. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1073 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Fee, supra note 100, at 1064-65.
132. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1073 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The presumption that a
permanent physical occupation, no matter how slight, effects a taking is wholly consistent
with [the Armstrong] principle. A physical taking entails a certain amount of'singling out."').
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c. Deprivation of All Economic Use
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that
a regulation that deprives property of "all economically beneficial
or productive use" constitutes a per se taking, unless the regulation
is consistent with background property and nuisance common law
principles. 3 A South Carolina statute, enacted after Lucas pur-
chased the lots at issue in the case, prohibited the construction of
permanent structures on undeveloped coastal properties in order to
avoid the hazards associated with further beach erosion."M In
explaining its categorical rule, the Court emphasized the severe
burden placed on owners by regulations that prohibit development
altogether. 3 ' The Court noted that the "total deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent
of a physical appropriation."'36 The Court added that
in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less
realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is
simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life in a
manner that secures an average reciprocity of advantage to
everyone concerned.' 37
Although the Court's opinion in Lucas focused primarily on the
verticality of the burden, the horizontality of the burden made it
into the opinion in two ways. First, the Court noted that when
"regulations ... leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use ... [they] carry with them
a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm."3 ' The Court suggested, in other words, that regulations that
deprive owners of all economically beneficial use of their lands
133. Id. at 1015 (majority opinion).
134. See id. at 1008-09.
135. See id. at 1017.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1017-18 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
138. Id. at 1018. The Court noted in its summary of the facts that Lucas intended to use
his property "to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already done:
erect single-family residences." Id. at 1008.
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usually single out those owners for the imposition of a burden that
benefits others. 3 s Second, the Court looked to the degree of burden
distribution to determine whether the regulation was consistent
with background property and nuisance common law principles,
which would have exempted it from the application of the
categorical takings rule.140 The fact that "other landowners,
similarly situated, [were] permitted to continue the use denied to
the claimant" suggested that the regulation was not a codification
of common law principles, but was instead a new type of land use
restriction that required the government to compensate the
owner. 141
At the same time, however, the Court made it clear that a
regulation is not immunized from a takings challenge simply "by
plundering landowners generally."' The government, in other
words, cannot protect itself against a takings claim involving a
regulation that imposes a severe vertical burden simply by spread-
ing that severity horizontally." Nevertheless, as Lucas illustrates,
the Court's takings opinions frequently note the issue of burden
distribution in determining whether governmental action consti-
tutes a taking.
2. Noncategorical Cases
The degree of burden distribution has also played a role in cases
where the Court has refused to apply a categorical takings rule, but
has instead called for an ad hoc analysis. The two most important
such cases are Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
139. See id. at 1018; see also Fee, supra note 100, at 1061 ("[T]he Lucas rule works as an
effective proxy for determining if some owners have been singled out to sacrifice property
usage rights for the benefit of others."). In his dissent, Justice Stevens "agree [d] that the risks
[associated with being] sing[led] out are of central concern in takings law," but questioned the
majority's suggestion that there is a correlation between regulations that deprive owners of
all economically viable uses of their properties and regulations that impermissibly single out
some owners. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
141. Id. at 1031.
142. Id. at 1027 n.14.
143. Although in this Article we emphasize the importance of burden distribution in
takings law generally and exactions law in particular, it is not our position that a regulation's
wide distribution of the burden, by itself, immunizes it from a takings challenge.
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York'" and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency. 45 In discussing both of these cases
below, we focus on the parts of the opinions that addressed the
degree of burden distribution that accompanied the challenged
regulations.
The property owner in Penn Central argued, inter alia, that the
landmark legislation at issue in the case, which prevented it from
building a skyscraper on top of Grand Central Station in New York
City, constituted a taking because the legislation imposed a unique
and distinct burden on its property. 146 As such, the owner argued,
the landmark legislation differed from zoning ordinances and
historic-district legislation, which apply to many owners throughout
specifically delineated districts. 4 v The owner complained, in es-
sence, that the government was singling it out and imposing a
special and unique burden on it in order to benefit the rest of New
York City's residents.'"
The Court rejected the owner's argument, noting that more than
four hundred different sites in the city had been designated as
landmarks.149 This meant, the Court concluded, that the plaintiff
was not, in fact, being singled out unfairly.5 0 The owners of those
other landmarks were under the same obligations to protect the
historical and aesthetic values of their properties.' 5 ' In addition, the
city's thirty-one historical districts applied similar restrictions to all
properties within their borders.'52 In the end, the Court believed
that the wide distribution of the burden "to a large number of
parcels in the city" provided the necessary "assurances against
[government] arbitrariness." 3
144. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
145. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
146. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 119, 131.
147. Id. at 131.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 134.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 132-35.
152. Id. at 132-34.
153. Id. at 135 n.32. The Court acknowledged that such assurances are usually provided
by the imposition of the same burden to an entire zoning area or district. Id. It concluded,
however, that given the large number of parcels that were subject to the landmark legislation,
the assurance against governmental arbitrariness was "comparable, if not identical." Id.
1544 [Vol. 47:1513
EXACTIONS AND BURDEN DISTRIBUTION
Like the majority opinion, then Justice Rehnquist's dissent paid
a great deal of attention to the question of whether the landmark
legislation sufficiently distributed the burden. 5 1 In contrast to the
majority, however, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the degree of
burden distribution was patently insufficient. 5 ' For example, he
noted that the government imposed the burden "on less than one
one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in New York City for the
general benefit of all its people."'56 He added that if all city residents
had to pay for the cost of preserving Grand Central Station, the per
capita charge would be only a few cents. 57 Emphasizing that the
landmark preservation burden had not been sufficiently distributed,
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the city's landmark scheme
resulted in "precisely [the] sort of discrimination that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits."5 8
Although the majority and the dissent in Penn Central clearly
disagreed on whether the degree of burden distribution that
accompanied the challenged legislation was sufficient to pass
constitutional muster, the issue played a crucial role in both
opinions. The same is true of the Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council. In that case, the plaintiffs argued that the
imposition of a thirty-two month moratorium on the development of
hundreds of environmentally sensitive lots in the Lake Tahoe
Basin deprived their properties of all economically viable use, thus
constituting a per se taking under the rule announced in Lucas.'59
The Court disagreed, noting that Lucas involved a permanent
deprivation of all economically viable use, while the Lake Tahoe
regulation was only temporary. 6 ° The Court did not stop there,
however. It also emphasized the important role that a temporary
moratorium can play in shaping the land use regulations that are
ultimately adopted upon its expiration.'6 ' The Court reasoned that
the wide distribution of the burden that accompanies a temporary
154. See id. at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 147-49.
156. Id. at 147.
157. Id. at 148-49.
158. Id. at 149.
159. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306,
316 (2002). For a discussion of Lucas, see supra Part II.A.l.c.
160. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 329-30.
161. Id. at 337-40.
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moratorium, such as the one at issue in Tahoe-Sierra, helps assure
that the government will not act arbitrarily by imposing burdens
on only a few selected owners.'62 The Court noted that temporary
moratoria applicable to many lots, unlike decisions regarding
whether to issue "a permit for a single parcel," give the government
an opportunity to study, deliberate, and plan in a comprehensive
fashion, while affording affected owners and the public the opportu-
nity to be heard.'63 As such, "with a temporary ban on development
there is a lesser risk that individual landowners will be 'singled out'
to bear a special burden that should be shared by the public as a
whole." 64
As we have shown in this section, one of the primary purposes of
the Takings Clause is to distribute the property-related burdens
imposed by government regulations as broadly as possible. This
primary purpose is reflected in the reasoning of several of the
Court's most important takings opinions, from early eminent
domain cases to later regulatory takings cases such as Penn Central
and Tahoe-Sierra.65 Our principal critique of the constitutional
162. See id. at 340-41.
163. Id. at 340.
164. Id. at 341 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987)).
165. The Court also emphasized the importance of burden distribution in its recent opinion
in Lingle v. Chevron U.SA Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005). The issue in Lingle was the continued
relevance of the standard announced twenty-five years earlier inAgins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980), that a government regulation "effects a taking if [it] does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests." Id. at 260. The Lingle Court held that the Agins standard
was an inappropriate takings test because it addressed neither the verticality nor the
horizontality of the burden. As the Court explained, "the 'substantially advances' inquiry
reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation
imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners." Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084. The
takings analysis, the Court added, demands an assessment of the actual burden imposed on
the property owner and of whether considerations of "justice might require that the burden
be spread among taxpayers through the payment of compensation." Id. The "substantially
advances" inquiry, on the other hand, tells us nothing about the degree to which the
regulation at issue singles out particular property owners. As the Court noted,
[t]he owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a
legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the
owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation.... Likewise, an ineffective
regulation may not significantly burden property rights at all, and it may
distribute any burden broadly and evenly among property owners.
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standard of review set forth in Nollan and Dolan is that it ignores
the degree of burden distribution associated with exactions.
B. The Constitutionality of Exactions and the Wide Distribution of
Their Burdens
The Court in Nollan and Dolan was concerned about the
possibility that the government might improperly leverage its police
powers to receive benefits from property owners without having to
pay for them.' By requiring an essential nexus between the
governmental purpose and the exaction, and by demanding a rough
proportionality between the impact of the development and the
nature and extent of the exaction, the Court sought to prevent the
government from using its authority to impose conditions on
development as a way of avoiding its obligation to compensate
owners under the Takings Clause.
As we explore in this section, the Nollan-Dolan framework, by
focusing exclusively on the essential nexus and rough proportional-
ity tests, does little to prevent the government from singling out one
or several landowners for differential treatment. The ability of the
government to choose among owners who are seeking to develop
their properties and impose exactions that are not imposed on
similarly situated owners makes it more likely that the government
will engage in improper leveraging. Furthermore, the government's
exercise of this type of discretion leads to the concentration, rather
than the dissipation, of the burdens associated with exactions,
which is precisely the opposite of what the Takings Clause is
intended to achieve.
1. Nollan and Burden Distribution
In Nollan, all of the owners of beachfront properties in the tract
of land that included the Nollans' property were required by the
California Coastal Commission to provide a lateral access easement
166. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994)
("A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." (alteration in original)
(quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922))).
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as a condition of development. 6 ' In fact, the Commission required
forty-three other owners in the tract to provide the same easement
that it required of the Nollans.'68 The Court, however, did not find
the degree of burden distribution relevant to the Nollans' claim that
there was no relationship between the exaction and the attainment
of the government's goal.'69
The Court's conclusion that the issue of burden distribution was
irrelevant to an assessment of the Nollans' takings claim may seem
reasonable at first. It can be argued, for example, that no amount of
burden distribution can make up for an insufficient nexus between
the state's ends and the means it chooses to reach them. What the
Court failed to appreciate, however, is that the degree of burden
distribution in exaction cases is an important criterion in assessing
whether the government has overreached by improperly leveraging
its police powers. This failure is surprising, given that the Court
placed a great deal of emphasis in Nollan on the need to deter the
government from improperly leveraging its authority.70
The government is more likely to engage in improper leveraging
when it imposes exactions on some owners and not on others, even
though the impact of the property development of both groups is
similar. In fact, it is reasonable to infer that when the government
chooses among similarly situated owners and requires exactions of
some, but not others, its goal is not to achieve a legitimate public
purpose, but is instead to leverage its authority to receive benefits
from the burdened owners without having to pay for them. If the
purpose of the exaction program is truly to mitigate a particular
type of community impact that accompanies development, then it is
reasonable to expect that the government will burden all owners
whose developments have similar impacts with similar conditions.
When the government picks and chooses among owners and imposes
exactions on only some of them, it acts arbitrarily. As a result, the
degree of burden distribution that accompanies an exaction program
is highly relevant to the question of whether the government has
overreached.
167. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 835 n.4.
170. Id. at 837 & n.5.
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The test that the Court adopted in Nollan only requires a certain
relationship-an essential nexus-between the government's goals
and the nature of the exaction. 7' To pass constitutional muster
under the Nollan test, the government does not have to distribute
exaction-related burdens widely among similarly situated owners;
it only must be certain that there is a sufficient nexus between its
means and ends.'72 The constitutional standard announced in
Nollan, therefore, can only go so far in deterring the government
from arbitrarily imposing improper exactions.
An example provided by the Nollan Court itself illustrates this
point. The Court posited that if the Commission had demanded a
viewing spot on the Nollans' property in order to offset their new,
larger house's contribution to the creation of a psychological barrier
to beach access, such an exaction would have passed constitutional
muster because there would have been an essential nexus between
what the government was trying to achieve and the nature of the
exaction.'73 This is especially true if we assume, as the Court did,
that the Commission could have prohibited the Nollans' new
development altogether in order to promote its goal of preventing
the formation of a psychological barrier to beach access.'74 The
important point for our purposes is that the viewing-spot exaction
would have been constitutional under the Nollan test even if the
Nollans were the only property owners in the area required to provide
the exaction. In order to strike down the viewing-spot exaction in the
hypothetical, the Court would have to rely on either the Armstrong
principle or the Equal Protection Clause rather than on the test
announced in Nollan.7 ' In short, there is nothing in Nollan's
articulation of the essential nexus test that requires the government
to spread the burden of exactions as widely as possible.'76
171. Id. at 837.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 836. The Court in Dolan confirmed this view when it stated that the
hypothetical exaction posited in Nollan "would have been constitutional," even if it required
the owners to provide a viewing spot to be used by the public. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 387 (1994).
174. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
175. See id. at 835 n.4. For a discussion of the difference in the degree of burden
distribution required by the Equal Protection Clause as compared to the Takings Clause, see
infra note 280.
176. The Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2005), recently
noted the inadvisability of incorporating another means/ends test into a takings analysis. As
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It could be argued that the Court in Nollan did, in fact, seek to
encourage the further distribution of exaction-related burdens. The
Court, after all, stated in the last sentence of the opinion that,
although California was free to pursue its comprehensive program
of promoting public access to beaches, it had to pay the Nollans for
their easement.'77 The Court appeared to encourage governments to
use general revenues to pay for public benefits that they had
heretofore acquired through exactions. This suggestion, however,
ignores the powerful forces and incentives that, by the time Nollan
was decided, were already pushing local governments away from
general taxes and toward nontax sources of revenues.'78 The lesson
for local governments coming out of Nollan, then, was not to
distribute burdens more broadly. Rather, the incentive was to
establish a closer link between their policy goals and the nature of
their exactions.
2. Dolan and Burden Distribution
The rough proportionality test that the Court announced in Dolan
also ignores the degree of burden distribution that accompanies an
exaction. Instead, that test looks only to the relationship between
the impact of the development and the nature and extent of the
exaction. 7 ' The Dolan standard, like the Nollan test, does not
compare how the government regulates the plaintiff owner with the
way in which it treats similarly situated owners.8 ° As a result, it is
not necessary for an exaction program to distribute burdens widely




already mentioned, see supra note 165, the issue in Lingle was the continued relevance of the
standard announced in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), that a government
regulation "effects a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests," id.
at 260. The Lingle Court noted that the Agins "test ... tells us nothing about ... how th[e
burden is allocated [and it therefore] cannot tell us when justice might require that the
burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment of compensation." Lingle, 125 S. Ct.
at 2084. Interestingly, the same criticism can be made of the Nollan means/ends test.
177. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42.
178. See discussion supra Part I.A.
179. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
180. See id. (emphasizing an individualized determination).
181. See id.
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Rather than focus on the degree of burden distribution, the Court
in Dolan emphasized the distinction between legislative regulations
and adjudicative exactions.'82 The Court was troubled by the fact
that the exactions at issue in Dolan did not involve a legislative
classification of an "entire area[] of the city," but instead involved
"an adjudicative decision to condition [the owner's] application for
a building permit on an individual parcel."'83 Although the Court did
not elaborate on the distinction, it did suggest that adjudicative
exactions are more suspect than legislative land use regulations
because the former relate to only one parcel.'
It is possible, at first glance, to believe that the legislative-
adjudicative distinction can serve as an effective proxy for the
degree of burden distribution that accompanies an exaction
program. It would seem, in other words, that legislative exactions
should do a better job of distributing burdens among owners than
adjudicative exactions. The latter ostensibly give greater discretion
to the government to impose conditions on development, thus
increasing the risk that the government will subject individual
landowners to greater burdens than similarly situated owners.
The record in Dolan, however, demonstrates why the legislative-
adjudicative distinction is a poor proxy for the degree of burden
distribution. The city, despite what the Court took to be the
adjudicative nature of its exactions, distributed the exaction-related
burdens widely. In fact, although the plaintiff owner argued that
she was "singled out" by the city for exaction purposes,'85 the record
suggests otherwise.
In the 1970s, the city developed a comprehensive plan that
addressed many land use issues, including those related to flood
control, flood prevention, and the creation of a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway to help alleviate traffic congestion.'86 The city codified the
182. Id. at 385.
183. Id. The Court made the same point later in the opinion when it explained that its
decision placed the burden on the government to show the existence of rough proportionality.
See id. at 391 n.8.
184. See id. at 385.
185. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Dolan v. City Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (No. 93-518),
reprinted in 229 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1993 TERM SUPPLEMENT 83, 103 (Philip B. Kirland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
186. See Brief for Respondent at 6, 11, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (No. 93-
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comprehensive plan through zoning ordinances contained in its
Community Development Code (CDC). 8 ' On the issue of flood
control and prevention, the CDC stated that "[wihere ... develop-
ment is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, the
City shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for
greenway adjoining and within the floodplain."'" A section of
Dolan's property was on the 100-year floodplain of a creek.'89 The
easement demanded of her was the same demanded of all "those
owning property along the creek ... when they sought approval of
land use permits ...."" Although Dolan argued that she was singled
out by the city, she was in fact regulated in precisely the same way
as all other owners along the creek. Just as important, she was also
regulated in the same way as all others who owned properties in
floodplain areas.'9 ' There was nothing in the record, in other words,
to suggest that Dolan was treated differently from other similarly
situated owners.
The city also distributed the burden widely when implementing
its plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. Dolan's property was
included in the original plan for the pathway, years before she
submitted the redevelopment proposal that was at issue in the
case. ' 2 The CDC stated that "[d]evelopments adjoining proposed
bikeways identified on the adopted pedestrian/bikeway plan shall
include provisions for the future extension of such bikeways
through the dedication of easements or rights-of-way."'93 The CDC
also required all owners of property in and adjacent to floodplains
518), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 185, at 127, 145, 150.
187. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377.
188. Id. at 379-80 (emphasis added) (citing CDC § 18.120.180.A.8).
189. See id. at 379.
190. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 185, at 6.
191. See id.; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 186, app. B at B-27 (citing CDC
§18.84.040.A.7, which states that "[wihere land form alterations and/or development are
allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, the City shall require the dedication
of sufficient open land area within and adjacent to the floodplain in accordance with the
comprehensive plan" (emphasis added)); id. app. B at B-62 (citing CDC § 18.164.100.B.1,
which states that "[wihere a subdivision is traversed by a watercourse, drainageway, channel
or stream, there shall be provided a storm water easement or drainage right-of-way
conforming substantially with the lines of such watercourse and such further width as will
be adequate for conveyance and maintenance" (emphasis added)).
192. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 186, at 11-12.
193. Id. app. B at B-63 (emphasis added) (citing CDC § 18.164.110.A).
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to dedicate easements for purposes of the bicycle/pedestrian
pathway.'94 Once again, far from being singled out, Dolan was
subjected to precisely the same exaction requirements that applied
to all other owners in the city whose properties were within and
adjacent to floodplain areas.195
In the end, even though the Court labeled the city's exactions as
adjudicative, the city distributed the burdens widely among
similarly situated owners. The legislative-adjudicative distinction,
then, does not necessarily correlate with the degree of burden
distribution. Adjudicative exactions, such as the ones at issue in
Dolan (and Nollan) can be quite effective in widely distributing
burdens. 196
The Court's focus on the legislative-adjudicative distinction,
rather than on the degree of burden distribution, means that the
latter is essentially irrelevant to the Dolan analysis. It also means
that, after Dolan, governments that create and implement exaction
194. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80 (citing CDC § 18.120.180.A.8, which states that "the
dedication of sufficient open land area for greenway adjoining and within the floodplain ...
shall include portions at a suitable elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway within the floodplain in accordance with the adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan"
(emphasis added)); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 186, app. B at B-27 (citing CDC
§ 18.84.040.A.7).
195. Dolan argued before the Supreme Court that the government improperly demanded
of her something "which [is] not required from the public at large." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386. If
the Court were to apply that standard, however, it would have to conclude that all land use
regulations constitute takings because they all, to some extent, impose burdens on some
owners that are not imposed on the public at large.
It could also be argued that the exactions in Nollan and Dolan impermissibly singled out
those owners who wanted to develop their properties by treating them differently from other
owners. That is always the case with exactions, however. The Court in Nollan and Dolan did
not prohibit the use of exactions; instead, it simply required governments to pay for exactions
that fail the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. It is generally proper to treat
owners who want to intensify the use of their lands differently from those who do not because
the former will impose harms on the community that the latter will not. See Mark W. Cordes,
Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
513, 515 (1995). As Justice Scalia, the author of Nollan, noted in a subsequent opinion, if
"there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation
and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy ... it cannot be said that [the owner]
has been singled out unfairly." Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Been, supra note 6, at 489 (arguing that
exactions "serve an important and legitimate purpose by ... forcing developers to consider [the
costs of their development to the community] in determining how much to develop").
196. There is also no guarantee that legislative exactions will distribute burdens widely.
See infra note 247.
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programs have little incentive to distribute the burdens that
accompany those programs widely. This leads perversely to the
further concentration, rather than the further dissipation, of
exaction-related burdens, which is inconsistent with one of the
primary goals of the Takings Clause.
3. Reciprocity of Advantage in Nollan-Dolan and Burden
Distribution
In this subpart of the Article, we have argued that the Court in
Nollan should not have ignored the issue of burden distribution. 9 '
We have also argued that the Court in Dolan focused on the
legislative-adjudicative distinction when it should have focused on
the degree of burden distribution.'98 Our third argument is that the
Nollan-Dolan test also fails to encourage the wide distribution of the
burden in exactions law because it ignores the benefits to owners
that accompany that distribution.
The relationship between a regulation's burdens and benefits is
referred to in takings law as the reciprocity of advantage.' The
idea is that the benefits that accrue to a burdened landowner from
a land use regulation should be taken into account in determining
whether the regulation effects a taking. The existence of such
benefits generally makes a finding of a taking less likely, while the
absence of benefits generally makes it more likely that a taking has
occurred.200
The scope of the reciprocity of advantage principle remains
unsettled in the legal literature.2O There is little agreement, for
example, on which landowner benefits should be relevant to the
takings analysis. We do not enter into that general debate;20 2
197. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
198. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
199. See, e.g., Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings:
Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 297 (1990); Lynda J.
Oswald, The Role of the 'Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of Advantage" Rules in a
Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449 (1997); Andrew W. Schwartz,
Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings,
22 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2004).
200. See Coletta, supra note 199, at 301-02.
201. See id.
202. Two important areas of disagreement on the issue of benefit typology as it relates to
the principle of reciprocity of advantage are beyond the scope of this Article. The first applies
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to any challenged land use regulation and involves whether the benefit that arises from the
regulation, in order to be a legitimate part of the reciprocity of advantage analysis, must be
unique to the owner, or whether benefits that the owner shares with members of the public
count as well. There has been wide disagreement on this question among members of the
Court. Justice Brennan was the strongest proponent of the view that reciprocity requirements
are met when the burdened landowner shares the benefits arising from the challenged
regulation with members of the public. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978) (arguing that sufficient reciprocity is established when the challenged
regulation benefits all citizens and structures); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825,856 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the challenged exaction benefited
the property owners "both as private landowners and as members of the public" (emphasis
added)). Justice Powell made a similar argument in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
262 (1980), when, in writing for the Court, he stated that restrictive zoning ordinances
"benefit the [property owners] as well as the public by serving the city's interest in assuring
careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas."
For his part, then Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central rejected the notion that the
benefits that the owner shared with members of the public as a result of the challenged
landmarks legislation was enough to offset the burden imposed by it. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S.
at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Here ... a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on
appellants; it is uniquely felt and is not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation
of some 400 other landmarks' in New York City."). Commentators also disagree on this point.
Compare Fee, supra note 100, at 1055-57 (arguing that the concept of reciprocity of advantage
should only apply when the burdened owners are the primary beneficiaries of the challenged
regulation), and Oswald, supra note 199, at 1514 (criticizing an "expansive social view of
average reciprocity of advantage" that accounts for benefits shared by burdened landowners
with the community as a whole), with Coletta, supra note 199, at 303 (arguing that "rather
than requiring that direct individualized benefits accrue to the burdened individual,
reciprocity defenses [shiould focus on the benefits gained by the community at large"), and
Schwartz, supra note 199, at 63 (arguing that "[jiudicial deference to the policy decisions of
legislatures necessarily requires a conclusive presumption that economic regulations other
than categorical takings achieve an average reciprocity of advantage").
The second area of disagreement is specific to exactions law and involves whether the
benefits that accompany the conditional approval of development proposals should be relevant
in assessing whether the conditions constitute takings. The Court in Nollan concluded that
development-related benefits should not be part of the analysis of whether an exaction effects
a taking. The Court stated that "the right to build on one's own property-even though its
exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements--cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2. Justice Brennan took the
opposite view in his dissent. He argued that the Nollans, by receiving the government's
permission to intensify their land use, enjoyed the benefit of the added value to their property
provided by the bigger house. See id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This was, according to
Brennan, "a classic instance of government action that produces a 'reciprocity of advantage."
Id.
The Court in Dolan also ignored the benefits that accrue to the owner as a result of the
approval, albeit with conditions, of the development proposal. Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent that "the Court ignores the state courts' willingness to consider what the property
owner gains from the exchange in question." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. at 374, 399
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He added that "the Court should not isolate the burden
associated with the loss of the power to exclude from an evaluation of the benefit to be derived
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instead, we focus specifically on the benefits that accrue to owners
as a result of the government's wide distribution of the burden. The
Court ignored this issue in Nollan and Dolan, and commentators
have paid little attention to it.
In exaction cases, courts should look to the relationship between
the degree of burden distribution and the existence of offsetting
benefits in the same way that the Supreme Court did in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency.2"3 In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court reasoned that the wide
distribution of the burden that accompanies a land use moratorium
provided burdened owners with "a clear 'reciprocity of advantage'
because it protects the interests of all affected landowners against
immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the
provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted."2 44 The wide
applicability of the burden, in other words, helps to ensure that
burdened owners enjoy corresponding benefits. °5 If the owners of
undeveloped lands in environmentally sensitive areas around Lake
Tahoe could not be guaranteed that similarly situated owners would
not be allowed to develop their land in ways that were inconsistent
with the land use regulations ultimately adopted, then the burdened
owners would not receive the benefits that would have resulted from
restrictions placed on their neighbors' use of their lands. °6 At the
same time, the neighboring owners who were not subject to the
temporary restrictions would enjoy the benefits of the reduced
development that result from the restrictions imposed on some of
the environmentally sensitive lots in the area, without sharing any
of the burdens.2 7
from the permit to enlarge the store and the parking lot." Id. at 402-03. The Court's position
on this point has been criticized by some commentators. See Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 570 (2001); Kendall & Ryan, supra note 6, at
1825-28. But see Oswald, supra note 199, at 1514 ("[Plermitting the landowners to develop
their own property, a use to which they were already entitled, can hardly be termed a benefit
that offsets any loss incurred as a result of the regulation.").
203. 535 U.S. 302, 341 (2002).
204. Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
205. As the Court noted, property values in the Lake Tahoe Basin were likely to increase
as a result of the moratorium because of "the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain
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The same causal relationship between wide distribution of the
burden and offsetting benefits for burdened property owners can
exist in exaction cases, as both Nollan and Dolan illustrate. In
Nollan, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the Commission's
general program of requiring owners in the area to provide lateral
access easements afforded the plaintiffs the important benefit of
being able to walk along the full length of the beach.0 8 The Nollans
were able to enjoy the benefit of having access to large sections of
the shorefront near their home because the Commission required a
lateral access easement of all owners in the area who sought to
develop their properties.2"9 In the absence of a wide distribution of
the burden-or, in other words, in the absence of a comprehensive
program on the part of the government aimed at providing public
access to beaches-the Nollans would not have benefited from the
state's exaction decisions.
The same is true in Dolan. The fact that the government required
all of Dolan's floodplain neighbors to dedicate easements in return
for permission to develop worked to her benefit. The restrictions
placed on her neighbors' ability to develop the parts of their
properties that fell within the floodplain area made it less likely
that Dolan's property would be flooded. At the same time, the
restrictions placed on her land benefited her lot as well as her
neighbors' properties.210
The same type of reciprocity of advantage existed in Dolan on the
issue of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway. The pathway plan sought
to reduce traffic congestion in the city's central business district.21'
The ability of the plan to attain that goal depended on the degree to
which it distributed the burden; the plan's effectiveness would have
been considerably undermined if only some of the owners in the
area were required to dedicate an easement for pathway purposes
as a condition of new development. The effective reduction in traffic
208. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 856 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 829.
210. Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that "[a]s the United States pointed out at oral
argument, the improvement that the city's drainage plan contemplates would widen the
channel and reinforce the slopes to increase the carrying capacity during serious floods,
confer[ring] considerable benefits on the property owners immediately adjacent to the creek."
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 400 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 387.
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congestion was dependent on the pathway crossing a relatively large
section of the city, so as to encourage residents to take some trips
on foot or by bicycle, rather than by car.212 A pathway of limited
length, or one with many gaps where owners retain unfettered
rights to exclude, would be considerably less effective in its ability
to reduce traffic congestion. The ability of Dolan and other owners
and residents in the area to benefit from the reduced traffic
congestion, in other words, depended on the city's willingness to
distribute the easement-related burdens widely. As we have already
noted, that is precisely what the city did.21
We do not claim that the reciprocity of advantage enjoyed by the
owners in Nollan and Dolan was necessarily significant enough to
deny the plaintiffs' takings claims in those cases. We are suggesting,
however, that the Court should have paid greater attention to
the relationship between burden distribution and reciprocity of
advantage. The wide distribution of the burden not only makes
sense because it avoids the problems created whenever the govern-
ment singles out and burdens only a few property owners," 4 but also
because it can provide landowners with benefits that offset that
burden." 5 The horizontal distribution of the burden among many
owners, in other words, can diminish its verticality, or severity, as
it affects any given owner. If the applicable constitutional test
allows the government to use the benefits to owners that accompany
the wide distribution of exaction-related burdens to defend the
constitutionality of its exactions, it will have a greater incentive to
distribute the burdens as widely as possible. This, in turn, will
make the imposition of exactions by the government more consistent
with one of the primary purposes of the Takings Clause."6
In the end, our critique of the Nollan-Dolan test is based on the
Court's insistence on focusing solely on the claimant's property to
determine whether the requisite essential nexus and rough
proportionality exist. We believe that the constitutional analysis
should be broader than that; it should also include the nature of the
exaction program that led to the imposition of the exaction that is
212. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 186, at 11.
213. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
216. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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subject to challenge. It should, in other words, look not only to the
verticality of the burden, but also to its horizontality by explicitly
asking how the claimant owner was burdened in relation to other
similarly situated owners. By also focusing on the exaction program
and its effects on properties other than the claimant's, a court can
determine the extent to which the exaction-related burdens are
distributed among similarly situated owners.217 The court can also
determine the benefits, if any, that accrue to the takings claimant
as a result of the degree of burden distribution that accompanies the
exaction in question.21
III. CURRENT DISTINCTIONS IN EXACTIONS LAW
Much of the post-Nollan-Dolan litigation has involved the issues
of whether the Nollan-Dolan test applies to legislative exactions and
whether it applies to monetary exactions, also known as impact fees.
Lower courts have disagreed widely on these matters. Some have
held that the test only applies to the types of exactions that were at
issue in the two Supreme Court cases-namely, adjudicatively
imposed requirements of land dedications." 9 Other courts have
217. We elaborate on this idea in the discussion infra Part IV.A.
218. We elaborate on this idea in the discussion infra Part IV.B.
219. See Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999-1000
(Ariz. 1997); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 692-98 (Colo. 2001) (en
banc); Parking Ass'n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994); Waters
Landing Ltd. P'ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994); see also Garneau
v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) (expressing doubt that Nollan and Dolan
.apply outside the context of physical invasions" of property); Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass'n
v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Nollan did not
apply because the challenged regulation "applies evenhandedly to entire areas of the City"
and because it "does not 'extract benefits' from [the owner] in the Nollan sense of requiring
some dedication ... to the city"); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir.
1995) (concluding that the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests "are limited to the
context of development exactions where there is a physical taking or its equivalent"); Harris
v. City of Wichita, 862 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Kan. 1994) (concluding that Dolan did not apply
to land use restrictions that are "legislative rather than adjudicative" and that "do not impose
upon plaintiffs the obligation to deed portions of their land to the local governments or any
other affirmative obligation"); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995)
(concluding that Dolan does not apply to impact fees); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of
Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that Dolan's rough
proportionality test does not apply to a fee imposed by a "citywide, legislative land use
regulation"); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that
Nollan and Dolan are inapplicable to conditions that do not require property dedication); Wis.
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applied the test to impact fees that are adjudicatively, as opposed to
legislatively, imposed.22 ° A third group has applied the test to
impact fees without distinguishing between legislative and
adjudicative exactions.22'
Commentators have also disagreed on which types of exactions
should be covered by the Nollan-Dolan test. Those who support the
idea of applying heightened scrutiny to exactions argue for a broad
reading of Nollan and Dolan so as to include all exactions within the
scope of the test. 22 In contrast, those who are critical of the
application of heightened scrutiny to exactions argue for a narrow
interpretation that will limit the application of the Nollan-Dolan
test to adjudicatively imposed land-dedication exactions.223
In our estimation, the time has come for the law of exactions to
move beyond the legislative-adjudicative and land-monetary
distinctions. The distinctions are primarily meant to serve as
proxies for the likelihood that the government overreached in
imposing exactions by leveraging its authority to deny approval of
development proposals in order to receive benefits from owners
without having to pay for them. Those who argue for a broad
understanding of Nollan-Dolan, in other words, believe that the risk
of leveraging is present regardless of the type and nature of the
Builders Ass'n v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 702 N.W.2d 433, 447-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing
to apply Nollan and Dolan to a facial challenge to a setback regulation).
220. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,464-65 (Cal. 1996); see also San Remo
Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105-06 (Cal. 2002) (refusing to apply Nollan-
Dolan to a legislative impact fee); Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 982
(Or. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
221. See N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-89 (Ill.
1995); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 354-56 (Ohio 2000);
Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 189-90 (Wash. 1994); Benchmark Land Co. v.
City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 173-75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), affd on other grounds, 49
P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002); see also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135
S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004) (holding that Dolan applies to both "a dedication of property
to the public and a requirement that property already owned by the public be improved" while
expressing skepticism of the position that it only applies to adjudicative exactions).
222. See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 6, at 395-408; Callies, supra note 6, at 571-75; Cordes,
supra note 195, at 539-43.
223. See, e.g., Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James C. Nichols, Impact Fees Should Not Be
Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAXING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUE : PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PERSPECTWVES 357 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan,
Comment, Land Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions To
Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 415, 453-55,459-62 (1995).
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exaction,224 while those who argue for a narrow understanding
believe that the risk of leveraging is limited to land exactions that
are adjudicatively imposed. 225 For the reasons articulated below, we
believe that the degree of burden distribution is a better indicator
of whether the government actually engaged in improper leveraging
when imposing an exaction.
Our proposal to subject all government exactions to a Nollan-
Dolan analysis is not intended to make it generally more difficult for
governments to impose exactions. Rather, it is meant to help
identify appropriate exaction programs by distinguishing between
exactions that distribute burdens widely and those that do not. In
doing so, we hope to encourage governments to adopt exactions that
are more consistent with important principles of takings law.
A. Legislative Exactions vs. Adjudicative Exactions
The prominence of the legislative-adjudicative distinction has its
origins in the Dolan Court's contrast between "essentially legislative
determinations classifying entire areas of the city [and] an
adjudicative decision to condition [an] application for a building
permit on an individual parcel."26 Many post-Dolan courts have
relied on this distinction. Most have held that the heightened
scrutiny called for by the Nollan-Dolan test does not apply to
legislative exactions because such exactions do not present the
same kind of risk of government leveraging as do adjudicative
224. See Breemer, supra note 6, at 397-405.
225. See sources cited supra note 219; infra note 227 and accompanying text.
226. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
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exactions.227 Other courts have disagreed,228 as have two Supreme
Court Justices.229
It is possible to criticize the continued constitutional relevance
of the legislative-adjudicative distinction in exactions law on the
ground that it is frequently nebulous and imprecise. This is because
the marked division of governmental functions that is constitution-
ally required at the federal and state levels is often absent at the
local level. Legislative bodies at the local level, for example,
frequently make administrative or adjudicative decisions.23 0 As a
result, as the Texas Supreme Court noted in a recent exactions case,
a "workable distinction ... between actions denominated adjudicative
and legislative" may be impossible at the local level.23'
The Supreme Court's analysis of the contrast between legislative
and adjudicative exactions in Dolan provided lower courts with little
227. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000
(Ariz. 1997) (concluding that "[tihe risk ... of leveraging does not exist when the exaction is
embodied in a generally applicable legislative decision"); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911
P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (concluding that a lesser standard of scrutiny applies to
"legislatively formulated development assessments ... because the heightened risk of the
'extortionate' use of the police power to exact unconstitutional conditions is not present");
Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001) (reasoning that "[o]ne
critical difference between a legislatively based fee and a specific, discretionary adjudicative
determination is that the risk of leveraging or extortion on the part of the government is
virtually nonexistent in a fee system"); Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003). In Dudek, the court reasoned that when an
ordinance requires a sorting out of the individual circumstances affecting the
applicant in deciding how the ordinance operates ... there appears to be a risk
of leveraging or singling out of the applicant for concessions as a condition of
development approval-a risk not present in widely applicable legislative
enactments that do not require the exercise of meaningful discretion in applying
the ordinance.
Id. (citation omitted).
228. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380,390 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620,641 (Tex. 2004).
229. See Parking Ass'n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995) (Thomas &
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
230. See, e.g., Northfield Dev. Co. v. City of Burlington, 599 S.E.2d 921,923 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (describing a city council's action in an administrative matter); see also Lacy St.
Hospitality Serv., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 809 (Ct. App. 2004)
(depublished) (noting that the Los Angeles City Council "was sitting in a quasi-judicial role
[when it] adjudicat[ed] the administrative appeal of constituents"). Furthermore,
nonlegislative bodies at the local level frequently take "legislative" actions. See Krupp, 19 P.3d
at 694 (applying a legislative label and presumption of validity to fee adopted by a single
purpose special district providing sewage treatment services).
231. Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641.
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guidance. The Court gave a rather broad scope to the adjudicative
label, suggesting that it was the city's decision to apply the exac-
tions "on an individual parcel"2 2 that triggered the heightened
scrutiny and rough proportionality requirements.233 This type of
reasoning is problematic because all land use regulations ultimately
must apply to individual parcels. Furthermore, the conditions im-
posed by the city that gave rise to the Dolan test were "legislative"
to the extent that they were part of the city's development code,
which had been adopted by the city council.234 In fact, the city's
exaction formula in Dolan appears no more "adjudicative" than the
typical formulas labeled as "legislative" by lower courts, and thus,
beyond the scope of Nollan-Dolan.235 If the Nollan-Dolan standard
232. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
233. Although the Dolan Court did not refer to it, the legislative-adjudicative debate has
a long history in state court opinions involving legal challenges to local land use regulations.
In 1973, the Oregon Supreme Court's widely cited opinion in Fasano v. Board of County
Commissioners limited the deferential judicial presumption of validity to those "legislative"
land use actions "laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of property."
507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973). More searching review and heightened procedural protections
should be available, in the Fasano court's view, in land use cases involving "the application
of a general rule or policy to specific individuals, interests, or situations." Id. at 27 (quoting
Comment, Zoning Amendment-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO
ST. L.J. 130, 137 (1972)). In the years since the Oregon court's decision, many state courts
have considered the Fasano rule, but only a few have adopted it. See, e.g., Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 471-74 (Fla. 1993); Cooper v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs of Ada County, 614 P.2d 947, 949-50 (Idaho 1980). A greater number of
courts has refused to follow the case, resulting in the vast majority of state courts treating all
land use decisions adopted by local legislative bodies as legislative and well within the
traditional presumption of deference. See, e.g., Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
370 P.2d 342, 346-47 (Cal. 1962); Parks v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the Town of
Southington, 425 A.2d 100, 102 (Conn. 1979); Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City of Honolulu,
78 P.3d 1, 9 (Haw. 2003); Quinlan v. City of Dover, 614 A.2d 1057, 1060 (N.H. 1992); Bow &
Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 307 A.2d 563, 567 (N.J. 1973); Hampton v.
Richland County, 357 S.E.2d 463,466-67 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Quinn v. Town of Dodgeville,
364 N.W.2d 149, 154-56 (Wis. 1985). It is worth noting that the Supreme Court in Dolan did
not rely on the rich state court precedent in the area, nor did it define the term "adjudicative"
with any degree of specificity.
234. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
235. Compare, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395 n.9 (stating that the city of Tigard based its
requirement of landowner dedication of land for bicycle and pedestrian paths on a formula
projecting 53.21 additional trips generated per one thousand square feet of additional
commercial space), with Krupp, 19 P.3d at 691 (stating that the Breckenridge Sanitation
District computed a "plant investment fee" by calculating average peak single family effluent
flow and multiplying that amount by the number of "single family equivalent" units in any
particular residential development). As the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, most impact
fee ordinances are based on averages and not a particularized assessment of a development's
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applies every time a general ordinance is applied to an individual
parcel, or if the presence of relief-granting discretionary waivers or
variances is the key,2"6 then the legislative-adjudicative distinction
becomes rather meaningless." '
Our principal criticism of the legislative-adjudicative distinction
in this Article, however, is not based on the lack of certainty or
predictability that accompanies its application. More fundamen-
tally, our argument is that the distinction serves as a poor proxy for
the existence of improper leveraging on the part of the government.
The legislative-adjudicative distinction assumes that the govern-
ment's exercise of discretion in the application of its exactions
programs will work to the detriment of the property owner. That
assumption, however, is problematic, and more than a little ironic,
because courts have traditionally viewed local discretionary devices,
such as subdivision waivers and zoning ordinance variances, as
actual impact. See N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384,391 (111.
1995).
236. It may be that Dolan's request for a variance was what made the application of
"legislative" enactments sufficiently individualized to fall within the Court's understanding
of the adjudicative label. In Dolan, the particularized inquiry was triggered when the
landowner sought a variance from the city's legislatively adopted Community Development
Code. 512 U.S. at 380. Provisions of that local law required dedication of pedestrian/bicycle
paths for landowners who redeveloped downtown properties. Id. at 377-78. In addition, the
Code required owner dedication of open land adjacent to or within the central city floodplain.
Id. at 378-79.
237. Principles of ripeness may actually require an owner of property to seek a waiver or
variance before the decision will be considered sufficiently final for purposes ofjudicial review.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Supreme
Court held that judicial review was premature because
It]here is no indication in the record that [the owners] have availed themselves
of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by
requesting either a variance ... or a waiver .... If [the owners] were to seek
administrative relief under these procedures, a mutually acceptable solution
might well be reached ..., thereby obviating any need to address the
constitutional questions.
Id. at 297. More recently, the Court described its ripeness doctrine as follows:
Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is
alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner's first
having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to
exercise their full discretion in considering development plans for the property,
including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 339-40 (2002)
(quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001)). If seeking a waiver is
sufficient to bring a case within the adjudicative label, all landowner challenges to exactions
are likely to fall within the scope of Nollan-Dolan.
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ways of preserving the constitutionality of land use regulations,
the strict enforcement of which would otherwise be arbitrary and
23capricious. 38 Consistent with this understanding, a regulation's
provision for discretionary adjustment, pursuant to either a
variance or an exception, has been found to save the ordinance from
a facial takings claim.23 9
The courts' application of heightened scrutiny to exactions that
they deem adjudicative makes the government's exercise of discre-
tion constitutionally suspect. The more discretion the government
exercises, in other words, the more likely it is to run afoul of
Nollan-Dolan. The question, however, should not be whether the
government exercises discretion; instead, the question should be
how the government exercises its discretion.24 ° Under the current
constitutional regime applied to exactions, governments are
encouraged to avoid exercising discretion in order to immunize their
exactions from Nollan-Dolan review. The result has not been fewer
238. See, e.g., Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Cmty. v. County of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d 12, 14
(Cal. 1974) (indicating that the legislature allows variances to insulate zoning laws from
constitutional attack).
239. See Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Ct. App.
2001); Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n v. DeKalb County, 588 S.E.2d 694, 697 & n.13
(Ga. 2003) (citing Lake Nacimiento Ranco Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872,877
(9th Cir. 1987)). Moreover, to the extent that the waiver and variance processes have been
criticized, local governments have been faulted for being too lenient in granting discretionary
relief to owners, rather than overly demanding. See David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance:
Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 279, 295-99 (2004).
240. Furthermore, the distinction between legislative and adjudicative exactions does not
always correlate with the presence or absence of governmental discretion. It is possible, in
other words, for so-called legislative exactions to give the government considerable discretion
in their application. See Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and
Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 266 (2000) ("[Tlhe
discretionary powers of municipal authorities exist along a continuum and seldom fall into
the neat categories of a fully predetermined legislative exaction or a completely discretionary
administrative determination as to the appropriate exaction."). As a result, some courts
further refine the legislative-adjudicative distinction by differentiating between legislative
exactions with little or no governmental discretion and legislative exactions that allow the
government to exercise significant discretion, applying Nollan-Dolan's heightened scrutiny
only to the latter. The court in Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69 P.3d 751 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), for
example, applied Dolan's rough proportionality test to an ordinance that impacted a broad
class of property owners because it "requires a significant exercise of discretion" on the part
of the government. Id. at 756. In doing so, the court distinguished the ordinance at issue
from ordinances that require a "mechanical and nondiscretionary process" for their
implementation. Id.
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exactions; instead, the result has been more legislative exactions
that impose fees based on "mechanical and nondiscretionary"
formulas.2 41 This trend has led not to the greater collectivization of
exaction-related burdens, but rather to their greater privatization,
as governments are encouraged to apply increasingly rigid and
detailed mathematical formulas on increasingly narrow segments
of the population in order to try to avoid a takings finding under
Nollan-Dolan.242
The evil to be remedied, then, is not governmental discretion as
such, because the state can exercise it in ways that either increase
or decrease exaction-related burdens.243 Instead, the evil is the
singling out of one or several owners for the imposition of a burden
that should be distributed more widely.2"
Although the goal of Nollan-Dolan is to prevent government
overreaching, the legislative-adjudicative distinction is both
241. See Dudek, 69 P.3d at 756. On the increase of legislative impact fees since Nollan and
Dolan, see Carlson & Pollak, supra note 22, at 116-25.
242. See generally Reynolds & Ball, supra note 12 (exploring the shift in local government
finance from collectivized to privatized financing of infrastructure and services).
243. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,460 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring)
(noting that individualized assessments may be preferable, "for reasons of fairness and
accuracy, to fees that are completely predetermined according to rigid legislative formulae,
and it would be illogical to impose on them more formidable constitutional hurdles"); see also
Fenster, supra note 6, at 675 (arguing that "[blargaining over individualized exactions is
consistent with the open norms necessary to successful mediation because it provides an
appropriate, flexible package of conditions and entitlements that respond to the particular
concerns of property owners, government officials, and interested members of the
community"); Reznik, supra note 240, at 270 (arguing that "[i]f legislative decisions are
shielded from the 'rough proportionality' standard and adjudicative decisions are subjected
to it, the result may be that extortionate behavior is granted deference, while fair processes
are overly scrutinized").
244. The California Supreme Court's opinion in Ehrlich has become the leading case in
support of the proposition that adjudicative exactions are subject to the Nollan-Dolan test,
while legislative exactions are not. The owner in Ehrlich wanted to change the land use on
his property from recreational to residential. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434. The city approved the
change but required the owner to pay $280,000 to help replace the recreational facility. Id. at
434-35. Although there was no majority opinion in Ehrlich, the court unanimously decided
that Nollan-Dolan applies to monetary exactions that are adjudicative and that the
recreational fee at issue in the case constituted a taking. See id. at 443-47; id. at 459-61
(Mosk, J., concurring); id. at 464-65 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 468 (Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In our estimation, the
fundamental problem with the exaction in Ehrlich was not that it was adjudicative, as
opposed to legislative. The fundamental problem was that the city council, in demanding the
fee, singled out one owner and imposed on him a burden not imposed on anyone else.
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overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because the
discretion present in an adjudicative context may produce less,
rather than more, hardship on the owner. Conversely, it is
underinclusive because the lack of discretion present in a legislative
context may produce greater, rather than less, hardship on the
owner.245 The distinction is also underinclusive because it fails to
account for the fact that the government can act with antilandowner
animus in the adoption of inflexible fees, just as it can in the
application of a fee to a particular landowner.246
If courts, as we propose, were to look explicitly to the degree of
burden distribution, the judicial process would focus on the nature
of the government's conduct-that is, whether it overreached-
rather than on the nature of its decision-that is, whether it was
legislative or adjudicative.2 7 In contrast to the way in which the
245. See Breemer, supra note 6, at 403-04 ("[Als the branch most accountable, and thus
most responsive, to the majority, the legislature may be especially prone to extort
disproportionate amounts of property from under-represented groups."); Reznik, supra note
240, at 267 ("The extortion and inequitable economic burdens that local governments
potentially impose on landowners through administrative processes can occur just as easily
in the legislative context.").
246. See Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex.
2004).
While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely to constitute a taking
than general legislation, we think it entirely possible that the government could
"gang up" on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of
constituents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would
otherwise bear were shifted to others.
Id.
247. Arcadia Development Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996), provides an example in which the court was more interested in the nature of the
government's decision than in the nature of its conduct. At issue in Arcadia was a city
ordinance that required owners of mobile home parks who wanted to close them to pay for the
relocation costs of displaced residents. Id. at 284. Mobile home park owners challenged the
ordinance, alleging that it constituted a taking. See id. at 285. In assessing the takings claim,
the court held that "[blecause this case involves a challenge to a citywide, legislative land use
regulation, Dolan's 'rough proportionality' test does not apply." Id. at 286. The court instead
applied a more deferential form of review and upheld the ordinance because protecting the
interests of residents of mobile home parks was a legitimate state interest, and there was a
nexus between the attainment of that goal and the imposition of the fee. Id. at 287.
In our estimation, the court in Arcadia failed to grapple sufficiently with the owners'
argument that the exaction effected a taking "because the ordinance unfairly 'singles out' or
places the burden of solving the City's housing problems on the shoulders of a few property
owners." Id. TheArcadia opinion is an example ofajudicial decision that uses the legislative-
adjudicative distinction as a proxy for the risk of improper leveraging, when an assessment
of the degree of burden distribution present in the case would have been a better indicator of
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legislative-adjudicative distinction currently serves as a proxy for
the risk that the government improperly leveraged its authority, the
degree of burden distribution goes directly to the issue of whether
the government actually engaged in improper leveraging.'
As we argued earlier, it is reasonable to infer that when the
government chooses among similarly situated owners and requires
exactions of some but not of others; its goal is not to achieve a
legitimate public purpose, but is instead to leverage its authority to
receive benefits from the burdened owners without having to pay
for them.2 49 Evidence that the government treats some owners
differently from similarly situated owners when imposing an
exaction has greater probative value on the question of leveraging
than does evidence related to the question of whether the exaction
qualifies as legislative or adjudicative. Only the former constitutes
actual proof of arbitrary action on the part of the government.
actual government overreaching.
Arcadia is also an example of a case involving a legislative exaction that only affected a
handful of owners. Although it is not possible to determine from the opinion precisely how
many owners were impacted by the exaction program, it is likely to have been only a handful.
See Levmore, supra note 105, at 312-13 (noting that ordinances regulating mobile park homes
usually burden only a few owners). This observation suggests that just because an exaction
program is legislative does not necessarily mean that it distributes the burden widely.
248. Judicial adoption of the burden distribution inquiry would change the nature of
evidence brought before the court in an exactions dispute. Under our proposal, it would be
much less likely that an appellate court would be confronted with the record with which the
Oregon Court of Appeals was confronted in Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69 P.3d 751 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003). At issue in that case was the constitutionality of an exaction that would have
required the owner to purchase an easement from neighbors in order to widen an existing
right-of-way. Id. at 752-53. The lawsuit in Dudek was brought by owners challenging the
failure of the local government to impose an exaction on one of their neighbors. Id. at 753. The
main question throughout the litigation, which included two different opinions by the Land
Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), was whether the exaction at issue was legislative or
adjudicative because that, in turn, partially determined whether the Nollan-Dolan test was
applicable. Id. at 753-56. The parties and the courts focused on what was essentially a legal
determination of whether the exaction was legislative or adjudicative. As a result, the factual
record made it impossible for the court of appeals to determine whether similar exactions had
been demanded of nearby owners. See id. at 756 n.7. Rather than focusing so intently on the
legislative-adjudicative distinction, as the court of appeals and the LUBA did, the judicial
review process would have been better served if the parties had an incentive to introduce
evidence relating to the degree of burden distribution present in the case.
249. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
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B. Land Exactions vs. Monetary Exactions
Courts have also used the land-monetary distinction as a proxy
for the risk that the government improperly leveraged its authority
in imposing exactions. The courts that have refused to apply
Nollan-Dolan to impact fees have concluded that the government is
much more likely to engage in leveraging or extortion when it
demands land than when it demands money.25 ° As one court
reasoned, "a fee [is] a considerably more benign form of regulation"
than is a land-dedication requirement.2 ' Another added that "the
risk of leveraging or extortion on the part of the government is
virtually nonexistent in a [legislatively based] fee system."2"2
As with the legislative-adjudicative distinction, we do not believe
that the land-monetary distinction serves as an effective proxy for
the likelihood that the government overreached in imposing an
exaction. Regardless of whether the exaction requires land or
money, the owner must provide what the government requires in
order to receive the necessary approval to develop. Thus, both
types of exactions raise the possibility that the government may
improperly leverage its police power in order to receive benefits
from the owner without paying compensation." 3 In addition, it is
not always the case that impact fees will be less burdensome than
land exactions. A large fee, for example, can impose a greater cost
on an owner than a requirement that she dedicate a small portion
of her property to the public."M
In the end, therefore, courts should focus directly on the degree
of burden distribution that accompanies the challenged exaction,
250. See Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001); McCarthy v.
City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995).
251. Home BuildersAss'n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 1000.
252. Krupp, 19 P.3d at 696.
253. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
254. There is also no assurance that impact fees will distribute their burdens among a
large number of property owners. It is likely, for example, that the tenant relocation fee at
issue in Arcadia Development Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996), only affected a handful of owners. For a discussion of Arcadia, see supra note 247.
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), is another case where the fact that
the exaction involved money and not land did not correlate with a wide distribution of the
burden. In fact, it appears that the city applied the recreational fee at issue only to the
plaintiff. See id. at 434-35. For a discussion of Ehrlich, see supra note 244.
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rather than on whether the exaction meets some definition of
adjudicative versus legislative or dedicatory versus monetary. This
shift in judicial inquiry would allow courts to assess how the
government actually implemented an exaction program, rather than
using the nature of the exaction to reach generalized conclusions
about when there is a significant risk of improper leveraging by the
government.
IV. AcCOUNTING FOR BURDEN DISTRIBUTION IN EXACTIONS LAW
In the previous Part, we criticized the ways in which many post-
Nollan-Dolan courts have responded to landowners' challenges to
exactions. It is now incumbent on us to articulate more specifically
how our proposed alternative, which would require courts to look to
the degree of burden distribution that accompanies the challenged
exaction, can be incorporated into the analysis of whether an
exaction effects a taking.
Although we have-in this Article and elsewhere-criticized the
shift by local governments away from using general tax revenues
and toward a more privatized funding model that increasingly
depends on nontax sources of revenue (such as exactions),25 we
are also aware that this trend is unlikely to be reversed in the
foreseeable future. As a result, our priority here is not to propose
how best to do away with exactions, or even how to reduce their
use significantly; instead, our goal is to suggest a modification of
the applicable constitutional standard of review to encourage
governments to distribute exaction-related burdens as widely as
possible.
The most effective mechanism for distributing burdens widely
is the use of general taxes to pay for public infrastructure and
services. Nontax sources of revenue, by definition, single out some
owners and impose burdens on them, based on the impact of their
land use on the community. 56 We do not suggest, however, that
nontax sources of revenue, such as exactions, are unconstitutional
because they do not distribute burdens as widely as general taxes.
255. See Reynolds & Ball, supra note 12; Reynolds, supra note 14, at 430-41; discussion
supra Part I.A.
256. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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The issue instead is: once the government decides to fund infra-
structure and services through the use of exactions, how far must it
go in distributing burdens? We aim to provide some answers to that
question in this final part of the Article.
A. Underinclusivity
In both Nollan and Dolan, the Court agreed with the landowners'
claims that the exactions at issue constituted takings, ignoring the
government's ample evidence that it had distributed the burden
widely among similarly situated landowners.257 The Court's failure
to consider this important evidence resulted in rules that have
had two significant negative effects. First, although the Court
invalidated the exactions before it, the test it announced has
provided incentives for the government to impose more, not fewer,
exactions.25 Second, because the test does not require that the
exactions apply broadly to similarly situated landowners, the
post-Nollan-Dolan exactions are more individualized and more
privatized than the previous ones. By making irrelevant the extent
to which exactions spread the burden widely among similarly
situated landowners, the Nollan-Dolan standard removes an
incentive for the government to seek broader distribution. The
result is a trend toward underinclusivityin government exactions,
producing charges and fees that would be more fairly borne by
broader segments of the community.
One way in which the degree of burden distribution can be
accounted for in an exaction case is by asking whether the exaction
program in question is underinclusive-that is, whether owners who
are similarly situated to the plaintiff owner are required to provide
similar exactions. We believe that underinclusivity should be as
constitutionally problematic under the heightened scrutiny called
for by Nollan-Dolan as it is under the heightened scrutiny applied
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.259 Courts should be more
257. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2.
258. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
259. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1976). The Oklahoma statute at issue in
Craig, which allowed young women but not young men to buy 3.2% alcohol content beer, was
held unconstitutional, in part, because it was underinclusive. Applying intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause to the state's sex classification, the Court concluded that
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skeptical of exaction programs that do not treat similarly situated
owners alike.60 Adding consideration of the extent of the govern-
ment's burden distribution in exactions to the judicial evaluation
would reflect the Supreme Court's longstanding emphasis on that
criterion in its takings analysis.
The irrelevance of burden distribution in the current exactions
analysis makes it possible for the government to impose narrow
charges that, we believe, should be constitutionally suspect. Two
cases illustrate our concern with underinclusivity. Although the
exactions challenged in both of these cases would likely meet the
Nollan-Dolan test, we believe that the government's failure to
distribute the burden more broadly should be constitutionally
suspect and that Nollan-Dolan should be reformulated to include
that factor.
Oklahoma failed to show that the risk of drinking and driving was substantially higher among
young men, meaning that the statute was underinclusive because it did not regulate the beer
consumption of young women. See id.
Underinclusivity is also problematic in equal protection cases where the Court has applied
a form of heightened rational basis review. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985) (holding that the denial of a special use permit sought by a home
for disabled individuals was unconstitutional because the government did not require a
special permit for the operation of nursing homes, boarding houses, and fraternities, even
though those uses raised similar safety and density concerns). In contrast, underinclusivity
is not problematic under the traditional rational basis test. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). At issue in Murgia was a rule that required all uniformed state
police officers to retire by the age of fifty. See id. The Court, applying rational basis review,
upheld the rule, see id., even though "[tihe challengers were able to show that [it] was
substantially overinclusive, dismissing many officers well able to discharge their physical
duties, and somewhat underinclusive, allowing many physically less able people to serve."
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2262 (2002); see also 3 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 18.2, at 213 (3d. ed. 1999) (noting that the "key factor" in determining whether
underinclusivity is problematic under the Equal Protection Clause is 'the standard under
which the justices will review the permissibility of the government ends and the degree of
relationship between the classification and these ends").
260. The question of underinclusivity must be distinguished from that of the total number
of affected property owners. What should be most relevant to the constitutional analysis is
not whether the number of affected owners is small or large, but rather whether the
government is distributing the exaction-related burdens widely among similarly situated
owners. If the number of burdened owners, however, is very small, that should be enough to
establish a prima facie case of underinclusivity.
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The first example is the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in
Home Builders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale.2"1 In
that case, land developers filed a legal challenge to a municipal
"water resources development fee" that was adopted to generate
revenue to fund the search for new supplies of water and new
systems to transport that water.262 State law required the city to
demonstrate the availability of sufficient water to meet its needs
for the next one hundred years.263 Unable to do so, and having
identified several possible, but costly, sources of water,26' the city
imposed an impact fee on new development to fund the search.2 5
The formula for the impact fee was straightforward. The city first
calculated the expected capital cost of bringing new water to
Scottsdale at approximately $2000 per acre-foot.266 It then computed
the average historical annual water consumption for various types
of uses, determining that single family residences consumed about
one-half of an acre-foot per year, while apartment usage averaged
three-tenths of an acre-foot per year.2 " Based on these figures, the
city charged $1000 for each new single family residence and
assessed new apartments a charge of $600 per unit.2' The amount
levied, then, corresponded to the projected yearly usage of each new
type of development.
In our estimation, Scottsdale's water resource fee program
raises underinclusivity concerns because it did not apply to prior
and current users of water. Those users, no less than new users,
contributed to the city's water scarcity. The scarcity, in fact, existed
long before the city attempted to remedy it with its narrowly
targeted fee on new development. 29 It is not clear why Scottsdale
261. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997).
262. Id. at 994.
263. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-576(E)).
264. The possibilities were wide ranging, including building a canal system to bring in
water from a source already owned by the city, constructing a treatment plant that would
produce potable water from sewage effluent, and obtaining water from Native American tribes
in the region. See id. at 994-95.
265. Id. at 995.
266. See id. at 999.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. In 1985, years before the fee was adopted, and before the arrival of the growth on
which the fee was assessed, the city commissioned a water resources study that "concluded
that Scottsdale clearly lacks sufficient water for the future." Id. at 994.
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should be allowed to single out one narrow segment of the commu-
nity when the city's entire population has contributed to the need
for a new water source. In fact, without the extensive development
in Scottsdale prior to the imposition of the fee, it is likely that
there would have been no need for the fee in the first place, or
alternatively, that the need would not have arisen for many more
years.27°
We also believe that the facts of San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of
San Francisco 27 1 suggest similar problems of underinclusivity. The
ordinance at issue in that case required that owners of residential
hotels pay a fee before converting rooms that were available to
long-term residents to rooms available only to tourists and other
daily users. 2  The fee program, which sought to ameliorate the
city's severe affordable housing crisis, applied only to the owners
of residential hotels. Singling out a narrow segment of the
community to fund a solution to a problem with wide-ranging causes
appears substantially underinclusive. Other groups of owners, after
all, likely impacted the affordable housing crisis in San Francisco
in similar ways.2 ' As a result, the city's failure to distribute the
exaction-related burden more widely should be constitutionally
problematic.275
270. The underinclusivity of the Scottsdale water resource fee also raises concerns about
efficiency and conservation. If the city had applied the fee more broadly to all water users, all
Scottsdale residents would have had a greater incentive to conserve water. By narrowly
defining the group of users subject to the fee, the community missed an opportunity to assume
greater responsibility for its own water consumption patterns. When the cost of finding new
water is placed on new development, the existing community does not feel the sting of
depleted resources and is thus less likely to conserve water than if the cost for remedying the
depletion is shared by all water users.
271. 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
272. See id. at 92.
273. See id.
274. For example, developers of new hotels who chose to use all of their rooms to serve
tourists and other daily users, rather than long-term residents, also contributed to the
problem that the city was trying to address through its room conversion fee.
275. In contrast, consider the exaction program in San Remo compared to the one at issue
in Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App.
2001). In the latter case, all new developers of residential property were required to either set
aside ten percent of the units for low- and moderate-income housing, or pay an in-lieu fee to
be used for that purpose elsewhere in the municipality. Id. at 62. Developers also had the
option of dedicating land or building new units of affordable housing off-site. Id. In City of
Napa, in other words, the burden for providing affordable housing was distributed among a
wider class of owners, namely, all residential developers.
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For those who support impact fees with the argument that it is
fair for government to impose a cost on those who impose a burden
on the community through their land development, the exactions
described above may seem reasonable at first glance." 6 In the case
of the Scottsdale fee, after all, the city had a severe water shortage,
new development could not proceed without water, and the fee was
closely tied to the new developments' projected consumption of
water. Moreover, the water impact fee seems to pass constitutional
muster under both Nollan's essential nexus test and Dolan's
requirement of rough proportionality.277 The fee was directly tied to
the city's legitimate, indeed essential, public purpose of finding new
water, and it was calculated to levy on the new development a
charge that represented no more than the burden it would impose
on the water supply.
Similarly, the San Remo fee seems to meet both constitutional
requirements. The city's fee was linked to the important public goal
of providing affordable housing. Moreover, the computation of the
exaction seemed roughly proportional to the impact caused by the
conversion-for each residential unit the owner removed from the
market, eighty percent of a replacement unit must be funded. 8
We believe, however, that both exactions illustrate the troubling
trend that Nollan and Dolan have facilitated. The exactions are
narrowly tailored, presumably to offset the negative impact of the
activities that led to the imposition of the fees. Yet the fees ignore
276. Although we are also sympathetic to the argument that growth should pay its own
way and that suburban sprawl has negatively affected our environment and our lives, we
believe that the incentives provided byNollan-Dolan actually exacerbate the negative impacts
of sprawl. In fact, we argue elsewhere that the proliferation of exactions and impact fees
provides sprawling development with a certain legitimacy because it has been "bought and
paid for." This facilitates more, rather than less, sprawl. See Reynolds & Ball, supra note 12,
at 471. When developers are willing and able to pay for some of the costs of development in
outer areas, the government has a reduced incentive to require more compact or infill
development. In the end, the community tolerates growth that it might not have allowed in
the absence of exactions. See id.
277. Neither the Scottsdale court nor the San Remo court applied the Nollan-Dolan test
to the exactions at issue because they concluded that the legislative, nondiscretionary
exactions at issue in those cases were beyond the scope of the test. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 105;
Homebuilders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 933, 999 (Ariz. 1997). Our
proposal would alter the analysis in both cases in two important ways. First, it would apply
Nollan-Dolan to all exactions. Second, it would expand the constitutional analysis to include
the issue of underinclusivity.
278. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 92 n.3.
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the wider communal responsibility for the serious problems that the
government is trying to address. They allow the government to
single out a relatively small segment of the community for the
purpose of finding a solution to problems with causes that extend
well beyond that narrow segment. As currently formulated, the
Nollan-Dolan standard does not require the government to take
steps toward ensuring broader community responsibility. By failing
to account for the horizontal degree of burden distribution, the
test ignores a crucial inquiry related to the ultimate fairness of
the exaction program that is subject to challenge.279 Our proposal
would reverse the shift toward increasingly narrow exactions by
invalidating government attempts to target one small segment of
the community when a broader swath can be identified as similarly
contributing to the problems that the exactions seek to address.280
279. As a practical matter, if the Nollan-Dolan test were sensitive to notions of
underinclusivity by requiring that similarly situated owners be treated similarly, it would
mean that the burden on any particular individual owner would be reduced significantly. If,
for example, Scottsdale had been required to impose a fee on all water users to pay for the cost
of finding a new source of water, the amount of the fee imposed on any given owner would
have been significantly less than the fee actually charged. Once again, this difference in the
magnitude of the burden points to the crucial relationship between the degree of horizontal
distribution of the burden and the degree of the vertical burden experienced by any given
individual owner.
The fairness concern behind the underinclusivity of some exactions is not limited to the
intramunicipal realm. It also has an intermunicipal component. Exactions and impact fees
are not realistic sources of funds for communities that are not experiencing growth. Thus, the
beneficiaries of these nontax sources of revenue tend to track socioeconomic lines, with
wealthier communities able to fund infrastructure by imposing costs on developers, an
alternative not available to poorer communities. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 22, at 122-
25 (noting how the Nollan-Dolan test has the "potential to exacerbate the urban/suburban
divide"); see also PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA's EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S
FUTURE 172 (1998) (describing how inner cities are unable to turn to exactions to fund new
schools, resulting in gross inequality in facilities). Although the argument about
intermunicipal inequality is beyond the scope of this Article, it is an additional indicator of
how exactions and fees can exacerbate urban/suburban inequality.
280. It could be argued that the Equal Protection Clause already prevents the government
from improperly singling out landowners for differential treatment and that it is therefore
unnecessary to modify the Nollan-Dolan takings analysis so as to explicitly account for the
degree of burden distribution. The Equal Protection Clause does prevent the government from
arbitrarily and capriciously singling out an owner and imposing on her requirements that are
not imposed on others. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (holding
that an owner raised an equal protection question when he alleged that the local government
required him to provide a thirty-three-foot easement in order to be connected to the municipal
water supply, while only requiring a fifteen-foot easement of other property owners). Thus,
for example, to return to a point noted earlier, if the California Coastal Commission had acted
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B. Reciprocity of Advantage and Rough Proportionality
To enhance the overall fairness of exactions, we have argued that
the government should be required to distribute burdens broadly,
and that its failure to do so should result in the invalidation of
exactions.2"' From the other side of the equation, we now argue that
fairness would similarly be enhanced if the constitutional test
included an assessment of the way in which the plaintiff owners are
benefited by the burdens imposed on similarly situated owners
pursuant to the exactions program. We argue, in other words, that
the reciprocity of advantage principle should be incorporated into
the rough proportionality test. This incorporation makes sense
because the test looks to the relationship between the burden on
the owner that results from the exaction and the impact of the
development.282 To the extent that an owner benefits from the wide
distribution of the burden that is part of the challenged exaction
program, it lessens the severity of the exaction-related burden
imposed on her.2"
so arbitrarily as to impose a viewing spot requirement only on the Nollans, the Commission
would have in all likelihood violated the Equal Protection Clause. See supra notes 173-76 and
accompanying text.
Equal protection doctrine, however, cannot promote the same degree of burden distribution
as would our proposed modification of the Nollan-Dolan standard, which would require courts
to address questions of underinclusivity. This is the case because, in the absence of improper
motivation by the government on the basis of, for example, race or sex, a government's land
use regulation or decision will be upheld under equal protection doctrine unless the owner can
show that it is "irrational and wholly arbitrary." Olech, 528 U.S. at 565. Under the highly
deferential rational basis test that is generally applicable to equal protection challenges to
economic regulations, in other words, the government will be able to defend its differential
treatment of one or several owners in the vast majority of cases. As we have already noted,
the type of judicial review that we think is appropriate when applying heightened scrutiny
under the Takings Clause is similar to heightened scrutiny review under the Equal Protection
Clause. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part IV.A.
282. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
283. In this Article, we limit our proposal to the idea that the benefits resulting from the
government's broad distribution of the burden be incorporated into the constitutional
standard. In some situations, a different type of benefit will also accrue to the burdened
landowner, that is, when an exaction provides a direct benefit to the burdened property itself.
A required road construction, for instance, may assist in the provision of public services, such
as water, sewer, and storm drainage, to a subdivision. We take no position on the relevance
of this benefit to the rough proportionality analysis, but we note that at least one court has
suggested that it should be relevant. See Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d
1227, 1234 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
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Our proposal would account for the fact that the burden of
exactions on owners is frequently diminished, often to a substantial
extent, by the benefits they receive from the government's wide
distribution of the burden. We have already noted the importance
of reciprocity of advantage to the Supreme Court's takings
analysis.2" Incorporating the same consideration into the takings
standard applied to exactions would add another crucial factor to
the constitutional assessment. In our estimation, the fairness of an
exaction frequently depends on the extent to which the exactions
program benefits the burdened property owner through its wide
application.
To illustrate how a court would apply our reformulation of the
Dolan standard, suppose that a municipality requires subdivision
developers either to dedicate a portion of their property for the
construction of new roads or to pay an in-lieu fee.28 If a property
owner challenges the exaction as lacking rough proportionality,
the argument will be that the burden imposed is not roughly
proportional to the impact of the development, and thus, the
exaction constitutes a taking under Dolan. In assessing the degree
of that burden, the court should not limit itself to looking at the cost
of the land dedication or fee in relation to the impact of the owner's
development. Rather, the court should account for the benefits
enjoyed by the owner that result from the imposition of similar
exaction obligations on neighboring subdivisions. Those benefits are
likely to be significant if the exaction program's wide distribution of
the burden has resulted in the improved availability and sufficiency
of roadways in the area."6
284. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.3.
285. Under our proposed application of the Nollan-Dolan test, it would not matter whether
the exaction is imposed legislatively or adjudicatively, nor would it matter whether the owner
or the government chooses the land dedication or fee option. See supra Part III.
286. As we have argued, the horizontal distribution of the burden among many owners can
diminish the verticality or severity of that burden as it affects individual owners. See supra
Part II.B.3. The facts in both Nollan and Dolan illustrate how wide distribution of the burden
that accompanies an exaction program can lessen the individual burden on any given owner
by providing a reciprocal benefit to that owner. The owners in Nollan received the benefit of
access to the sections of their neighbors' properties immediately adjacent to the beach as a
result of the California Coastal Commission's requirement that all beachfront owners in the
area who sought to develop their properties provide a lateral access easement to the public.
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. This benefit to the Nollans somewhat
mitigated the burden that accompanied the easement that the Commission required of them.
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Dolan's rough proportionality test does not require a "precise
mathematical calculation."287 Our modified rough proportionality
inquiry should be subject to a similar standard, such that a court
would not require a precise value of the benefit to the owner that
results from the wide distribution of the exaction-related burden.
The government, which has the burden to show the existence of
rough proportionality under Dolan, however, would still be required
to undertake an "individualized determination" to estimate the
benefit. 8 If the government can do so, then it should be allowed to
rely on that benefit to help meet its constitutional obligation under
the rough proportionality test.289 The current test's failure to include
consideration of the average reciprocity of advantage can lead to the
invalidation of exactions whose burdens on the owner have been
substantially reduced by the benefits created by the exactions' broad
applicability.29 °
Similarly, the owner in Dolan received the benefits of a more effective flood prevention and
control program, as well as of reduced traffic congestion, both of which resulted from the city's
requirement that her neighbors provide easements to address problems associated with
flooding and vehicular traffic. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text. These benefits
lessened the burdens that accompanied the easements that the city required of her. We
believe that these types of benefits should be included in the constitutional analysis.
287. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994).
288. Id. at 391.
289. Another way of thinking about our proposal is that we suggest that courts focus on the
net rather than the gross exaction-related burden when the difference between the two is the
result of the government's wide distribution of the burden. In this way, our proposal differs
from Professor David Dana's suggestion that the component of the rough proportionality
analysis relating to the development's impact on the community should account for the
benefits to the community of that development. See Dana, supra note 6, at 1277. In other
words, Dana posits that the Dolan test should look to the net, rather than the gross, burden
to the community, while we argue that it should look to the net, rather than gross, burden to
the owner. As explained previously, however, we are limiting our analysis in this Article to
offsetting benefits that accompany the wide distribution of the burden. See supra note 283.
In this way, our proposal also differs from that of Professors Douglas Kendall and James
Ryan, who argue that all regulation-related benefits to the owner, including those that arise
from the permission to develop, should be accounted for in the application of the Dolan test.
See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 6, at 1825-28.
Although the Dolan rough proportionality test does not explicitly call for a consideration
of the average reciprocity of advantage, at least one state supreme court appears to have
factored it into its decision to uphold a road impact fee. See Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton
& the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000) (holding that
there must be a reasonable relationship between an impact fee used for the construction of
roads "and the benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new roadways"
(citing with comparison Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391)).
290. Some lower courts have invalidated sidewalk exactions on the ground that the local
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In a recent case, the government raised the type of reciprocity
of advantage argument that we propose courts should take into
account in applying the rough proportionality test. In Hallmark
Inns & Resorts, Inc. v. City of Lake Oswego,29' the owner of a parcel
of land located between a residential subdivision and a commercial
area relied on Dolan to challenge the city's requirement that it
construct and dedicate a sidewalk across its property.292 Rough
proportionality was lacking, the owner argued, because its seven-
teen employees would not impose an impact proportional to the cost
of six blocks of sidewalk.293 Moreover, because the path's main
purpose was to connect the residential area on one side with the
commercial area on the other,294 the primary benefit of the exaction
would redound to people other than the owner and occupants of its
building. Both of these facts suggested a lack of rough proportional-
ity under Dolan.
The city responded to the owner's challenge with the types of
arguments that we propose should be relevant to the constitutional
analysis. First, it pointed to the fact that the plaintiff was one of
many nearby owners who was burdened by sidewalk require-
ments,295 thus asserting the relevance of the exaction program's
inclusiveness. Second, the city noted that the plaintiffs employees
government did not establish that the development being asked to provide the sidewalk would
generate a sufficient impact on the pedestrian system. In none of the cases did the court
consider whether the burden on the developer had been offset by the average reciprocity of
advantage received from other developers' similar contributions. See, e.g., McClure v. City of
Springfield, 28 P.3d 1222, 1226-27 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle
Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 948-51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343,
350-57 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). The landowners and courts involved in these cases appeared
not to have heeded the Supreme Court's suggestion in Dolan that "[diedications for streets,
sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions." 512 U.S. at 395. In
fairness, however, the narrow strictures of the Dolan rough proportionality test encourage
precisely the type of challenges raised in these cases. Sidewalk and road improvement
exactions are rarely proportional to the impact of the development being assessed. Their
longstanding validity has always rested on judicial recognition of the public welfare being
furthered by imposition of the exactions, as well as the benefit provided to the burdened
property by the exaction itself. See, e.g., Brous v. Smith, 106 N.E.2d 503, 506-07 (N.Y. 1952)
(noting the "essential" value of roadways and holding that a town's requirement that a builder
improve an adjacent road was "reasonable and valid").
291. 88 P.3d 284 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
292. Id. at 285.
293. Id. at 288.
294. Id. at 289.
295. Id. at 288-89.
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could be expected to benefit from the "public pathway system,"296
thus pointing to the reciprocity of advantage created by the sidewalk
contributions of other owners. The city, in other words, suggested
that whether the burden placed on the plaintiff was roughly
proportional to the impact of the development could not be deter-
mined by looking at its property in isolation from nearby properties.
Instead, it argued that the analysis should also evaluate the degree
of burden distribution that accompanied the exaction program by
comparing the plaintiffs burden with those of similarly situated
owners.297 The city's argument suggested that the constitutional
standard should account for the benefits that accrue to owners as a
result of the wide distribution of exaction-related burdens. We
believe these types of considerations are relevant to the fairness
of an exaction because they are crucial to an accurate assessment
of the ultimate burden imposed on an owner. For that reason,
they would be important factors under the test that we propose.
They are, however, irrelevant under the current constitutional
standard.29
Potentially more significant in its impact is the Texas Supreme
Court's recent holding in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates
Ltd. Partnership.299 In that case, the court held that a town's road
exaction program constituted a taking under Dolan because the cost
of the improvement of the adjacent arterial was not roughly
proportional to the estimated impact of the subdivision.'0° This was
the case because the subdivision's contribution to the traffic on that
segment of the road was expected to constitute a mere eighteen
percent of the total traffic.3 's Although the court recognized that
Dolan's rough proportionality test would allow the town to assess
the landowner for the subdivision's impact on the town's entire
roadway system,0 2 it did not agree that the owner's burden could be
296. Id. at 288.
297. Id. at 288-89.
298. The court in Hallmark Inns upheld the exaction because it concluded that the city
properly relied on a reasonably projected increase in use of the property in estimating the
impact of the development for purposes of the rough proportionality test. See id. at 291-92.
In doing so, it did not specifically comment on the city's reciprocity of advantage argument.
299. 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
300. Id. at 644.
301. Id.
302. Id.; see also Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications-Local
Government Responses to Nollan/Dolan Takings Law Issues, 29 STETSON L. REV. 675 (2000).
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offset by the reciprocal benefit it received from all other owners'
contributions of paved roads to the town's overall system.3 ' As a
result, the court invalidated the exaction on rough proportionality
grounds."°
If the rough proportionality test were reformulated along the
lines we suggest, the Texas court's analysis would have been
significantly broader. Under our proposal, the judicial inquiry would
have first asked whether the town's road improvement program
was widely imposed on all new development in the community,
invalidating any exaction found to be underinclusive. Subsequently,
and in addition to the traditional Dolan rough proportionality
analysis, the court would have inquired whether, and to what
extent, the residents of the subdivision would enjoy the use of a road
system constructed by the exactions imposed on other development.
Faus shows how a municipality's assessment of a development's impact can be broadened to
include its effect, not merely on the road that it is being asked to improve, but on the town's
entire roadway system. See id. at 689-93. Presumably, this new calculation would satisfy
Dolan's rough proportionality test. See id. at 691-93. The shortcomings of this approach
include the inherently costly nature of the consultants' studies and reports necessary to come
up with that computation, as well as the way in which it forces municipalities to resort to
more mechanical, inflexible formulas whose precision is more myth than reality. See Reynolds
& Ball, supra note 12, at 459-63. Moreover, the Flower Mound court's suggestion that it is
proper to account for the new development's impact on the town's entire roadway system
encourages the government to assess a contribution from new development that represents
the impact it will have on existing infrastructure, even though that infrastructure was already
financed by general revenues and the contributions of other development. It is not
immediately clear how a local government could justify a double charge for the same
infrastructure, unless it plans to refund the payments made by those who funded the initial
construction. This type of cost recoupment is out of step with the view of economists "that
marginal costs are the most relevant measure of the costs development places on a
community." ALTSHULER ET AL., supra note 47, at 79.
303. See Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 644-45. The negative impact on the town's finances
resulting from the invalidation of the exaction was compounded by the fact that the city had
offset the owner's impact fees by an amount roughly equal to the cost of repairing the adjacent
road. The town, in other words, applied its road impact fee to calculate that the subdivision
should pay $879,234. See id. at 626. Subsequently, the town reduced the fee to $281,580 and
argued in court that the discount of approximately $600,000 was intended to offset the cost
of the invalidated road improvement exaction. See id. The Texas Court of Appeals concluded
that the city could not have properly considered the cost of the disputed repaving in adjusting
its impact fee because the road at issue was not on the city's capital improvement plan. See
id. The court did not, however, reinstate the $800,000 impact fee, even though that figure
presumably reflected the town's computation of the development's overall impact on the
existing roadway system, which the court specifically indicated the city was authorized to
collect. See id. at 626-27.
304. Id. at 644-45.
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Depending on the benefits derived from the broader imposition of
the exaction burdens, the court might have concluded that, although
the cost of the arterial improvement was high when compared
to the subdivision's projected use of that specific section of the
road, the exaction met Dolan's rough proportionality standard
when accounting for the benefits received by the subdivision from
a "system of reciprocal subdivision exactions."3 ' The average
reciprocity of advantage enjoyed by the subdivision from the
exactions imposed on others should be an important factor in the
constitutional analysis because it is both an important indicator of
the fairness of the government's program and a more accurate
computation of the real burden imposed on the landowner.30 6
Under our proposed reform of the Nollan-Dolan test, judicial
scrutiny would go beyond a means/ends analysis, as well as beyond
the narrow evaluation of the relationship between the cost or
burden imposed by the development and the amount of the exaction.
We argue that the Nollan-Dolan analysis should expand to include
two broader considerations. The constitutionality of exactions
should depend on the degree of the government's burden distribu-
tion and on the reciprocity of advantage that the plaintiff owner
receives from the burdens imposed on similar properties. Thus, we
305. Id. at 644. The town in Flower Mound made a vague argument about the average
reciprocity of advantage in the town's roadway exactions program, but the court ignored it as
too "abstract." Id. at 645. We have already noted that our modification of Dolan's rough
proportionality test would require an individualized assessment of the benefit received. See
supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text. In fairness to both the town and the court, neither
can be faulted for failing to articulate an argument that is currently irrelevant under the
Supreme Court's test.
306. In Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1996), the
hearing officer below made similar observations about inclusivity and average reciprocity of
advantage to uphold a county road improvement exaction. Id. at 1235-36. With regard to the
extent of burden distribution, the officer noted that the county's ordinance "require[d] that
all new development ... provide additional right-of-way and make road improvements." Id. at
1233. In an implicit reference to the average reciprocity of advantage, the officer argued that
"Itihe residents of this subdivision will utilize the road system constructed by other
developments at no cost to these residents." Id. The appellate court ruled that both of those
additional bits of evidence were irrelevant, concluding that Dolan's standard required only
a computation of "the relationship between the impacts of the development and the approval
conditions." Id. at 1236. Because the subdivision was projected to increase traffic by only 2.6%
on the street that it was asked to improve, the court found that the government could not
require the developer to pay for the entire improvement. See id. at 1235-36. By limiting the
analysis to the narrow confines of the rough proportionality inquiry, the court ignored
important evidence relevant to a more complete assessment of the exaction's fairness.
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would supplement the current narrow inquiry with a broader
analysis that is more nuanced, more complete, and, ultimately, more
fair.
CONCLUSION
For the last several decades, significant shifts in local government
financing techniques have been working at counter purposes with
the Takings Clause. While the Clause requires that governments
distribute property-related burdens as widely as possible, local
governments have been moving in the opposite direction by further
narrowing their sources of revenue. The "exactions revolution" that
has taken place in the last thirty-five years is one of the most
important examples of this growing dependence on narrowly
targeted revenue-raising mechanisms to pay for infrastructure and
services.
Nollan and Dolan presented the Court with an opportunity to
bring local government exactions into greater compliance with the
purpose of the Takings Clause. Although the Court in both cases
seemed generally skeptical of exactions and their use, the constitu-
tional analysis that it announced did little to encourage local
governments to distribute exaction-related burdens more widely.
For that to happen effectively, we believe that the constitutional
analysis must pay considerably more attention to the ways in which
exaction programs distribute burdens among similarly situated
owners.
The beneficial effects of our proposed modification of the constitu-
tional analysis applicable in exaction cases are twofold. First, our
proposal will further collectivize, rather than further privatize, the
burdens associated with paying for local infrastructure and services.
Second, it will allow courts to police the implementation of exactions
more effectively by distinguishing between improper exactions that
entail the government's leveraging of its police powers and exactions
that, in a fair and just manner, seek to attain legitimate public
purposes.
The imposition of general taxes represents the best way of
collectivizing the burden of paying for public infrastructure and
services. By definition, nontax revenue-raising mechanisms do not
apply to as broad a class as general taxes. It is unlikely, however,
that we will return to the period in local government financing when
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general taxes constituted the only important source of locally
derived revenue. Even if nontax sources of revenue are here to
stay, it is nonetheless necessary, for the constitutional and policy
reasons outlined in this Article, that courts require local govern-
ments to impose nontax obligations on property owners in ways that
distribute burdens as widely as possible.
